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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Toward a Greater Understanding of the Impact of Anger on Attitudes Toward War:
A Consideration of Three Hypotheses
by
John Paul Schott
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Alan J. Lambert, Chair

Previous research indicates that emotion is an important factor in shaping attitudes towards war.
Specifically, studies have shown that the experience of anger leads to increased support for war.
However, little is known about the mechanisms and boundary conditions of the anger-war
attitudes effect. In this dissertation, I propose three potential mechanisms: time perspective,
changes in risk perception and preference, and cognitive control. Results indicated risk
perception and preference and cognitive control were not related to either anger or war attitudes.
The consideration of future consequences (CFC) scale, used to measure time perspective,
revealed only weak effects as a mediator. However, there was much stronger evidence of its role
as a moderator. In particular, participants’ position along the CFC scale—their tendency to
exhibit or not exhibit a focus on the future—did determine the nature of the relationship between
anger and war attitudes. People who focused on the present became more pro-war as their anger
increased. Therefore, focusing on present or future consequences appears to be an important
factor in war opinion formation. Implications of these results and ideas for future research are
discussed.
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Introduction
Few public policy issues are of greater importance than waging war. Military conflicts are
inherently matters of life and death for both soldiers waging the battles against one another, and
the civilians trapped in between. The preparation for, and the execution of, military actions are
also of enormous monetary cost. In the United States, defense spending for fiscal year 2011 was
$718 billion, accounting for 20% of the country’s total federal budget (cbpp.org, 2012). For
these reasons and the myriad of other facets of society impacted by war, it is critical that we
acquire a more substantial understanding of the factors that influence the public’s support for
war. This is the overriding motivation for the present set of experiments.
In this dissertation my main focus was on anger and the role it might play in driving
people to support war more than they otherwise would. One important clarification of my
research goals is worth noting at the outset. The central purpose of my research was not simply
to show that anger tends to promote greater support for war. This assertion is not particularly
noteworthy (although, as I will discuss presently, there is less direct empirical evidence for this
relation than one might suppose). Rather, my main focus was on the reasons why anger might
produce this kind of effect.
Of course, the most obvious mechanism to explain anger’s effect on war attitudes is to
simply assume that anger increases aggression, and that these higher rates of aggression are
causing the increased support for war. On the one hand, it is obviously true that the emotion of
anger is intertwined with aggressive thought and action (Berkowitz, 1990). To this extent, it is
reasonable to suppose that experimental induction of anger would, in turn, increase the
likelihood that people would generally be more receptive to aggressive actions and policies,
including those carried out by the government. On a theoretical level, however, it is ultimately
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unsatisfying to simply conclude that “anger makes people think and act in aggressive ways” and
simply view any links between anger and pro-war attitudes as part of the overall cycle of
aggression. This position is a theoretical dead-end, offering no further insight into anger other
than the knowledge that angry emotion leads to angry attitudes. I was interested in
understanding why anger might affect attitudes, especially given that there could be more than
one mechanism driving this effect.
For this introduction, I first briefly discuss and explain some key terminology that is used
throughout the dissertation; this discussion is important in order to clarify the points to be made
later. Next, I consider the literature that is relevant to the relation between anger and pro-war
attitudes, with special attention to some less-than-obvious complexities that are relevant to these
considerations. Following this, I present three hypotheses that are relevant to the issue of why,
exactly, anger might have a systematic effect on these attitudes. Because anger’s impact on war
attitudes is most certainly due to a host of biological, motivational, and cognitive processes, a
complete understanding of these mechanisms is not possible in one set of studies. However, I
elected to study three possible mechanisms in particular: consideration of future consequences,
changes in risk, and limitations on cognitive control. The overarching goal of the present
research is to test for these variables as possible mediators of anger’s causal influence on
attitudes towards war.
DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS
Emotion vs. Mood
In the social and personality literature, psychologists sometimes have made a
distinction between emotions versus moods when referring to internal affective states (Schwarz,
2007). Strictly speaking, emotions have specific referents or objects whereas moods are more
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general and typically do not have specific referents (Schwarz, 1990). In principle, this
distinction can be important, although the difference between emotions and moods is not so
easily made in practice. For example, if someone kicked your shin in the subway, it is likely that
this action will put you in an angry mood, in addition to eliciting angry emotion toward the
perpetrator. It is also worth noting that the same techniques often used to measure mood (i.e.,
adjective checklist approach) are often used to measure emotion, and vice versa. Hence,
although the distinction between emotion and mood may be important in certain contexts, it is
not especially critical here. For the sake of consistency, however, I shall use the term “emotion”
throughout the paper whenever I am referring to internal states of the participant.
State vs. Trait-Based Differences in Emotion
In the present context, my main focus was on experimentally-induced (i.e., “state”)
differences in anger, in which participants are randomly assigned to an anger inducing versus
control task. However, as with most other types of emotion, anger can also have trait-like
properties, reflecting reasonably stable differences across people in terms of their chronic levels
of anger. Whenever experimental designs seek to manipulate a particular variable, it can often be
useful to measure, prior to the manipulation, pre-existing individual differences with respect to
that construct. At the very least, this approach can allow the researcher to covary out individual
differences in the given construct, to permit a clearer assessment of the effect of the experimental
manipulation. However, depending on the context in which this strategy is employed, it is also
possible that assessing these individual differences in combination with the experimental
manipulation can yield more insight than if one merely focused on the experimental
manipulation alone. In my case, it is was not clear on a priori grounds how much, or even
whether, trait-based anger would play a role in these studies. Hence, in the discussion to follow,
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I focus my primary attention on experimentally-induced anger, given that this provides the most
leverage with respect to inferring causality. However, it should be kept in mind that I also
measured trait-based differences in anger prior to the experimental manipulations.
ON THE EFFECTS OF ANGER ON WAR-RELATED ATTITUDES
On intuitive grounds, one might naturally assume that there would be some relation
between anger and attitudes toward war, especially when such attitudes pertain to militaristically
aggressive actions and policies of one’s own government. This is generally what the literature
shows. For example, a number of recent studies (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Sadler,
Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006) have shown
that angry (vs. non-angry) people are more likely to support aggressive actions by the United
States in the context of the “war on terror” (e.g., show greater support for invading Iraq).
All of these studies strongly suggest a positive relationship between anger and war
attitudes. However, they have two key limitations. First, all of these studies used a
nonexperimental design, precluding any definitive conclusions regarding the causal impact of
anger on attitudes and allowing for the possibility that a third variable is affecting both
constructs. Second, most of this past research investigating the anger-war link used memories of
a military conflict or attack (e.g., the events of 9/11 attacks) to elicit the emotion of anger.
Hence, there was a perfect confounding with the dependent variable (attitudes toward war) and
the factors that were used to elicit the emotion of anger in the first place, the latter of which were
grounded in memories of a previous war. As noted in Lambert, Scherer, Schott, Olson,
Andrews, O’Brien, and Zisser (2010), studies that prime memories of past wars are explicitly
increasing the accessibility of cognitions (e.g., speeches by presidents, memories of war-related
broadcasts) that could also affect attitudes, over and above any consequences of activating the
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emotion of anger. Hence, if one wants to more effectively isolate the consequences of anger, it is
preferable to activate that emotion using an experimental manipulation that has nothing directly
to do with war or even politics in general.
Such empirical demonstration must also show that there is something about anger per se
on pro-war attitudes, as opposed to other negative emotions, or states of high arousal, that are
correlated with this emotion. I am aware of only one such study that meets these criteria, and
that is the recent study published by Lambert et al. (2010). Across four studies, this work
showed that experimentally-induced anger (controlling for changes in other internal states, such
as sadness, anxiety, or arousal) led to significant pro-war shifts in attitudes toward the Iraq War.
Equally important, the magnitude of this effect was shown to be the same, regardless of whether
anger was elicited in a context that was related to war (Experiments 1 and 2) or not (Experiments
3 and 4). In the latter case, angry mood was elicited by having participants write about an
autobiographical event that had nothing to do with war or even politics in general.
The “Why” Question
Over and above the foregoing issues, one additional element is needed in order to fully
understand any linkage between anger and attitudes towards war: A research design must also
be able to address why anger might be exerting this kind of effect. This includes a greater
understanding of the conditions under which anger may, or may not, lead to increased support
for war. Stated somewhat differently, it is important at the outset to establish that anger has a
causal effect on war attitudes. Although the number of studies that have shown evidence for this
causal relation is surprisingly small, the available evidence does seem to support this conclusion
(cf. Lambert et al., 2010). However, such data does not speak directly to the processes by which
anger might produce these sorts of effects, and the factors that might moderate when they do or

5

do not, occur. In the next section I present three potential mechanisms that are relevant to these
considerations.
PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES
As described above, one of the overarching aims of my research is to understand why and
how anger might lead to systematic changes in attitudes toward war. In this research, I propose,
and empirically test, three hypotheses that are relevant to this overarching aim, including the (a)
time perspective hypothesis, (b) risk hypothesis, and (c) cognitive control hypothesis. To
anticipate a potential misunderstanding, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive of one
another. For example, evidence that supports (or does not support) the first hypothesis does not
bear directly on the validity of the other two. Hence, each of these hypotheses should be
considered as conceptually distinct from one another.
THE TIME PERSPECTIVE HYPOTHESIS
One possible mechanism driving anger’s causal impact on war support is the fact that
angry people may not be thinking very much about the future. That is, when people become
angry, their attention is drawn away from the future and the upcoming consequences
(Lowenstein, 1996). There are several reasons why this might be so. For one thing, many of the
problems that make us angry have to do with events that have occurred in the past, especially
those events that are perceived to violate one or more norms of justice. As Michael Ross and his
colleagues have noted (e.g., Starzyk, Blatz, & Ross, 2009), anger has extremely “long legs”, in
the sense that people’s memories of past events, even those that have occurred centuries ago
(e.g., an ancient battle between warring nations), often have the capacity to trigger hostilities
among nations. In this sense, anger represents a kind of “backward looking” emotion in the
sense that this emotion is often rooted in one’s memories of things that have already happened.
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The general tendency for anger to foster decreased consideration of the future could
potentially account for several known consequences of this emotion. For example, consider the
traffic-induced experience of anger commonly known as “road rage”. A driver becomes
infuriated by a fellow drivers’ lack of automotive aptitude, and decides to pull over, get out of
the vehicle, and act on his anger. While in the heat of the moment, it is unlikely that the “rager”
is carefully contemplating the future consequences of his actions. Rather, he or she may be
thinking in the short-term moment, “I’m going to get this guy for almost knocking me off the
road!” rather than the long-term consequence “On second thought, I could hurt this person quite
badly, and pay a lot of money in a lawsuit”. As many of us know, this focus on the short-term
can cause us to make ultimately poor decisions that fulfilled our immediate desires, but were
harmful in the long-term.
The tendency for anger to shift attentional focus away from the future may very well
transfer to conflicts of a larger scale, such as military conflicts. When a nation is provoked by
another nation or organization, the offended is likely to be more focused on meeting short-term
goals (e.g., of revenge, or to bolster one’s immediate sense of security), as opposed to
considering the future consequences of their present actions. As history demonstrates (and as
several writers have noted cf. Denson, 1999), the effects of war can include many long-term
negative economic, societal, and military consequences that far outweigh the short-term goals
achieved by engaging in war. Based on this premise, I hypothesized that one of the mechanisms
causing anger to increase support for war is the shift of focus to short-term over long-term
consequences.
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A Closer Look at the Time Perspective Construct
The preceding discussion of time perspective is relevant to a much larger and rather
diverse literature bearing on issues such as delay of gratification (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999;
Mischel, 1966), “time perspective” (Zimbardo, 1999), delay discounting (Green, 1994),
probability discounting (Green & Myserson, 2010), self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996), impulsivity (Madden & Bickell, 2010), and the want/should conflict paradigm
(Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998; Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008) to name
just a few areas of research.
For the present purposes, the concept in this area of research that is most congruent with
my hypotheses is the degree to which people are concerned with present and future
consequences. The consideration of future consequences (CFC) construct was originally defined
as “the extent to which people consider the potential distant outcomes of their current behaviors
and the extent to which they are influenced by these potential outcomes” (Strathman, Gleicher,
Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). Individuals who score low on the CFC scale are highly concerned
with the immediate consequences of behavior and have little concern for the delayed
consequences of their actions. In contrast, people scoring high on the CFC scale place greater
importance on future consequences and less importance on the immediate consequences of
behavior. Low CFC scores are related to a variety of behavioral outcomes including higher
alcohol and cigarette use (Strathman et al., 1994), less exercise (Ouellette, 2005), lower sleep
quality (Peters, Joireman, & Ridgway, 2005), and lower grade point average (Joireman, 1999).
CFC is also related to attitudes towards pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., recycling) and some
political issues (e.g., offshore-drilling) (Strathman et al., 1994). Most importantly for the present
research, the existing literature indicates that CFC is related to anger and aggression (Joireman,
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Anderson, & Strathman, 2003). Specifically, individuals scoring higher in anger tend to score
lower on the CFC scale and vice versa, a finding that supports the idea that, compared to other
individuals, angry people tend to be less concerned with the future.
Mediation vs. Moderation
The CFC scale could potentially play two kinds of roles in the present context. First,
CFC could mediate the effect of anger on support for militaristically aggressive policies. In this
type of model, I assumed that CFC would show some degree of situational fluidity, in that
experimental induction of anger could lead people to score lower on the scale (i.e., would show
decreased consideration of the future) than they otherwise would. Note that this position does
not contradict the assumption that CFC can and does tap meaningful individual differences in
time orientation. Rather, this merely assumes that any given measure can tap meaningful
variability owing both to aspects of the person, as well as the situational context in which the
scale is completed. However, because the scale had not been used to measure temporary
changes in CFC, there was some question whether or not it could do so effectively. In order to
maximize the CFC scale’s potential to capture fluctuations in state levels of the construct, the
scale was moderately altered from its original form for the present study. In the instructions,
participants were told that they may have a particular preference on most days, but to make
responses based on how they feel “right now in this moment”.
CFC could also act as a moderator variable, insofar as the effect of the anger
manipulation on support for militaristically aggressive policies could be moderated by the extent
to which participants score relatively high or low on this scale. For example, it could be that the
tendency for anger to foster support for militaristically aggressive policies would be especially
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pronounced for people who score low in CFC (i.e., are usually less concerned with future
consequences in the first place).
THE RISK HYPOTHESIS
Another potential mechanism of the anger and war relationship involves two aspects of
risk: perceptions of risk and willingness to make risky choices. Before considering this
hypothesis in any great detail, however, it is important for my purposes to make a distinction
between risk perception as opposed to risk preference. As will become clear presently, these are
distinct facets of risk and were hypothesized to play their own role in explaining why anger
might lead to systematic changes in war attitudes.
Risk Perception
In this dissertation, I define risk perception as an individual’s subjective belief that a
particular positive or negative event will occur. For example, let’s say two people, Jim and Bob,
are both late to a job interview and that they are both considering driving over the speed limit in
order to arrive in time. Suppose further that Jim believes that there is a 1% chance that he will
get a ticket, whereas Bob believes that the probability of getting a ticket is 30%. In this case, the
behavioral option (i.e., “should I speed?”) is identical for both persons, but they obviously differ
in the perceived likelihood of a negative outcome (i.e., getting a ticket) if they were to engage in
that behavior.
Although there is no single, agreed-upon way of measuring perceived risk, the most
common method of measuring this construct is to ask participants’ how likely certain life events
are to occur (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). For example, in this type
of research paradigm participants are typically presented with a list of target outcomes or events
(e.g., how likely it is that they will marry wealthy, the probability they will contract a sexually-
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transmitted disease, or the number of people who will be killed in the next year by a terrorist
attack). The logic employed here is that the perceived probability of an event occurring is the
same as the perceived risk of occurrence. As defined here, risk perception bears some
resemblance to the concept of optimism. Indeed, the technique used in the study by Lerner and
Keltner (2001) involved an adaptation of a well-known measure of optimism developed by
Weinstein (1980). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, as employed here, the
construct of risk perception is broadly defined as the subjective likelihood of negative as well as
positive events1.
Risk Preference
Another important aspect of risk is risk preference. Here, the focus is on the degree to
which the person is, or is not, likely to engage in a given risky behavior, holding perceived risk
constant. Returning to my earlier example, now suppose that Jim and Bob both hold identical
beliefs about the probability of getting a ticket, and both believe that the chances are quite high
(50%). Suppose further that they also have identical perceptions with respect to all other
relevant outcomes present in this situation (e.g., they hold identical beliefs about the likelihood
of getting a job offer after the interview). Even if one were to hold every single aspect of their
beliefs constant, it still could be that Jim might be more likely to speed than Bob. In this case,
Jim and Bob differ in their apparent preference for risk, insofar as Bob appears to have a lower
tolerance for engaging in behaviors that are associated with potentially serious and negative
outcomes, even though he does not actually differ from Jim in terms of how likely those
outcomes are considered to be. In this case, one might loosely say that Bob is less of a “risk
taker” than Jim, but a more precise way of rendering this difference is that these two individuals

11

differ in how they prefer to act in the context of risk, with all relevant aspects of their
perceptions held constant.
As used here, the concept of risk preference bears some resemblance to the constructs of
risk aversion (vs. risk taking), as studied by Kahneman and Tversky in their line of work on
prospect theory (1979). In one of the more well-known paradigms employed in this literature,
participants are asked to select among one of two potential choices after being explicitly
informed of the relevant probabilities associated with each decisional optional. For example, in
the famous “Asian disease” problem, participants are told that if they choose treatment A, there
is a 100% chance that 200 (out of 600) people will definitely live. However, if they choose
treatment B--the “riskier” of the two decisions--there is a 1/3 chance that everyone will live, but
a 2/3 chance that everyone will die. One of the interesting findings to emerge from this work is
that seemingly trivial differences in the way that the problem is framed can lead people to have
relatively greater preference for the risky choice, which is not normally seen as a viable option.
For my purposes, however, the most important aspect of this research is that people are explicitly
given the relevant probabilities associated with each decision and, as such, risk perception is held
constant. Nonetheless, as the research by Kahneman and Tversky shows, people can differ in
their preferences for choosing to act in certain ways, even though the risk perceptions are held
constant.
The construct of risk preference (as opposed to risk perception) is also relevant to work in
the personality area. Early research in this area suggested a general link between extraversion
(Eysenck, 1990) and risk, but more recent work suggests that preference for risky behaviors and
choices may actually be driven by individual differences in sensation seeking, a dimension which
is correlated with, but distinct from, extraversion (cf. Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Hoyle,
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Fejfar, & Miller, 2000; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000; Steinberg, Albert, Caufmann, Banich,
Graham, & Woolard, 2008). This raises the possibility of a dynamic interchange between risk
preference and risk perception, which I discuss in more detail below.
Risk Perception and Risk Preference in Real-Life Decisions
In most real-life decisions, people rarely know all of the relevant probabilities of their
decisions (or potential decisions) ahead of time. In such cases, there may be a fluid, dynamic
interchange between risk perception and risk preference. For example, a person who downplays
the risks of skydiving (e.g., believe that the odds of a failed parachute are low) are probably more
likely to prefer this sport compared to those who believe that these risks are high. Or, the reverse
may be true, insofar as preferences can drive perceptions. For example, a person who (for
whatever reason) loves to skydive may attempt to justify that lifestyle by arguing that the
perceived risks of the sport are actually lower than is commonly believed.
Nonetheless, although risk perception and risk preference may sometimes be related, they
are clearly distinct and it is reasonable to suppose that that they are not always perfectly
correlated. An individual who is “risk-seeking” may very well perceive that a situation has a
high probability of a negative outcome (e.g., “yeah, failed ‘chutes do happen all the time”), yet
will still make the risky choice. Conversely, an individual who is “risk-averse” may perceive
that an act has a low probability of a negative outcome, but could still select the option with the
least amount of risk. Put another way, risk perception is looking at a situation and asking, “Are
there risks?” Risk preference asks, “Should I act knowing the risks?”
Anger and Risk
In the emotional appraisal literature, one often sees the claim that anger tends to promote
“risky” decision making (Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens, & Shonk, 2010). This position seems to
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validate our intuitions, as angry people often appear to engage in behaviors that, from an outside
perspective, seem rather inadvisable. For example, people who are very angry often choose to
retaliate against others in ways that run the risk of making the situation even worse, leading to an
escalating cycle of negative outcomes. One way of framing this sort of anger-driven riskiness is
that the emotion of anger, by its very nature, tends to lead people to engage in actions that are
intrinsically risky.
These considerations raise a number of questions, however. For one thing, what aspect
of risk might be involved here? Is it the case that anger produces a shift in preferences for risky
behavior and decisions, leaving perceptions of risk unaffected? Or, is it the case that anger
affects risk perception, insofar as angry people are more “optimistic” than non-angry people, a
state of affairs that ultimately leads them to engage in behaviors, and support decisions, that nonangry people would tend to reject out of hand because of the perceived dangers associated with
them? Of course, anger could, in principle, be relevant to both aspects of risk, insofar as this
emotion might simultaneously (a) lead people to view the future more optimistically (i.e., see
positive outcomes as more likely, and negative outcomes as less likely) and also, (b) lead to a
greater preference for risky choices, holding perceptions constant.
What does the literature show with respect to these considerations? It should be noted at
the outset that the risk literature generally focuses on either risk perception or preference. It is far
rarer for researchers to measure perceptions and preferences within a single line of research (for
notable exceptions see Klein & Cerully, 2007; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; and Sokolowska, 2006).
Focusing more specifically on studies that have explored the role of anger, I am aware of only
one article that has measured risk perception as well as risk preference, that by Lerner and
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Keltner (2001). This study is especially relevant to the current discussion and is therefore worth
discussing in some detail.
In Study 1 of Lerner and Keltner (2001), researchers found a positive correlation between
trait anger and risk preference on the afore-mentioned Asian disease problem. Specifically,
anger was positively correlated with a tendency to prefer the more risky of the decisional
alternatives. Moreover, this study nicely separated the effects of anger (which was positively
correlated with preference for risky decisions) from anxiety (which was correlated in the
opposite direction). To reiterate a point made above, use of the Asian disease problem provided
valuable leverage that anger influenced risk preference, not perception, because all participants
were simply told to accept the given probabilities as fact. Note, however, that this study was
nonexperimental and hence could not show the direct causal effect of anger on this sort of
preference.
The remaining studies (Studies 2-4) showed a relation between anger and risk
perceptions. In particular, anger was shown to be associated with a pattern of “optimistic” risk
perceptions, such that anger was associated with higher probabilities of positive outcomes, but
lower probabilities of negative outcomes. In other words, anger seemed to promote a general
“rosiness” in thinking about the future. Two of these studies (Studies 2 and 3) demonstrated this
pattern using a nonexperimental design, whereas the final experiment (Study 4) demonstrated
this effect using an experimental design, in which participants were randomly assigned to an
anger vs. anxiety induction task. This latter study showed greater optimism among participants
assigned to the former compared to the latter condition. Unfortunately, this study did not contain
a control group. A control group is critical in order to separate the effects of anger from anxiety
and vice versa. Stated differently, it is not clear whether the observed effects were mostly due to
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the “optimistic” effects of anger, the “pessimistic” effects of anxiety, or whether both types of
emotions were contributing.
Summary and Potential Implications
To summarize, the available literature suggests that the emotion of anger is likely to lead
people to adopt more pro-war attitudes than they might otherwise endorse. Nevertheless, much
of the available evidence in this regard is nonexperimental and, even for the research that has
shown this effect using an experimental design (cf. Lambert et al., 2010), it is far from clear why,
exactly, anger might have this effect. As for risk, there is some evidence that anger can affect
risk in at least two ways, both by leading to a systematic shift towards risky decision making
(holding risk perceptions constant) but, also, in leading people to hold more optimistic views of
the future. As noted above, however, the available evidence is not completely definitive in this
regard. Setting aside these complexities, however, these considerations raise a provocative and
empirically testable set of propositions regarding the role that risk might play in the relation
between anger and pro-war attitudes.
ANGER, RISK, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR
An essential point of the risk hypothesis is that differences in risk perception and risk
preferences will affect the way individuals make judgments about engaging in war. In
considering this possibility, it is important to note that I am assuming that war is an intrinsically
“risky” enterprise, in the sense that any large-scale military campaign typically carries the
possibility that there will be significant casualties associated with that war. Of course, war is
also associated with the potential for loss in a material sense, as waging a large scale war is
inordinately expensive. For example, the United States Congress has allocated over 1 trillion
dollars for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 (Reuters.com, 2010). One could always
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justify these potential losses in several different ways, either on moral grounds (e.g., “we must
fight evil, no matter what the costs”), or on the grounds that victory is certain (e.g., “this will all
be worth it at the end, once our enemy is defeated”). However, the reality of war is that the
eventual outcome is never known in advance and, as such, there is always the possibility that
things could go disastrously wrong. Nevertheless, despite these obvious risks, people can and
often do support entry into war, and this seems especially true when people are angry. This
raises the possibility that the link between anger and war attitudes is determined in some way by
changes in risk. I describe these possibilities in a more formal way below.
Hypothesis 1A (Mediation)
One possibility is that the effect of anger (X) on war attitudes (Y) is mediated, in part, by
changes in risk perception and/or risk preference (Z). In one version of this meditational model,
anger leads to a general shift towards optimism, such that angry people are generally likely to see
positive outcomes as more likely, and negative outcomes as less likely. Hence, when confronted
with the prospect of a large-scale military invasion (e.g., the entry of the United States into war
with North Korea), anger would tend to change the perceived risks of war, such that angry
people would, compared to non-angry people, (a) believe that victory is more likely and that (b)
the military involvement would entail fewer “losses” including those associated with loss of life.
In other words, if the emotion of anger tends to breed general optimism, this fact alone might be
responsible, in part, for the fact that angry people are more likely to support entry into war.
Another possibility (not exclusive of the first) is that anger leads people to become more tolerant
of the risks of war, holding perceptions constant. In this view, anger leads people to have a
greater preference for engaging in risky enterprises and, as such, paves the way for greater
support for war, even though the actual risks associated with this attitudinal position remains
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unchanged. It is also possible that both risk perceptions and risk preferences would act as
mediators at the same time, but independently from one another.
Hypothesis 1B (Moderation)
In addition to its possible role as a mediator, risk could also act as a moderator variable.
In particular, even though risk can be affected by situational variables, there is ample evidence
that risk perception and preferences have “trait-like” properties as well. Thus, even if risk is not
affected by anger, it could be that pre-existing differences in risk perception and/or risk
preference determine the magnitude of the effect of anger on support for militaristically
aggressive policies. For example, the tendency for anger to foster support for militaristically
aggressive policies could be especially prevalent among dispositionally optimistic risk
perceivers. Here, dispositional differences in risk perception could moderate the relation
between anger and attitudes, such that the magnitude of this relation would be greater among
people who are generally optimistic in their perception of risk. In addition, it could also be that
differences in risk preference could also moderate the relation between anger and attitudes, such
that this relation would be stronger among people who have a chronically high preference for (or
tolerance of) risk. Additionally, it is possible both mediation and moderation effects could also
occur simultaneously.
THE COGNITIVE CONTROL HYPOTHESIS
In the two preceding sections, I considered the possibility that anger might affect (a) how
people think about the future (cf. the risk hypothesis), and/or (b) whether they are thinking about
the future at all (cf. the time perspective hypothesis). Here I consider a third and rather different
possibility, that anger can more broadly affect the way that people process information. In
particular, I proposed that anger can lead to a general decrease in people’s tendency to process

18

information in an analytic manner, leading them to engage, instead, in more heuristic styles of
decision making. To anticipate the line of reasoning ahead, I suggest that anger leads people to
latch on to rather simple rules of thumb (i.e., heuristics) which, in the context of a military
conflict, could lead people to show more support for an emerging war than they otherwise
would. In the discussion to follow, I first provide a very brief summary of what is known about
the determinants of processing style, that is, whether people process information in an analytic
versus heuristic manner.
Early studies of mood and processing style generally have tended to focus on the
differential consequences of positive and negative affect. Most of these studies concluded that
negative affect caused individuals to process information in an analytical, detailed, and careful
fashion (often labeled “systematic processing”) whereas positive affect caused individuals to
process stimuli in a shallow manner, using less effort and less attention to detail (Clore, Schwarz,
& Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995). This “heuristic-based” processing generally includes a reliance
on pre-existing knowledge structures, peripheral cues, and cognitive shortcuts (e.g., stereotypes)
for social judgments and decision-making.
More recent research suggests, however, negative emotions do not inevitably lead to
increased systematic processing. In particular, although sadness does appear to induce greater
reliance on systematic processing (Bless et al., 1990; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997;
Schwarz & Bless, 1991), anger produces an entirely different effect. In particular, studies on
anger suggest that it acts in a manner similar to other positive emotions (e.g., happiness) and
causes individual to use a more shallow, heuristic-based processing style (Bodenhausen,
Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner et al., 1998; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Small & Lerner, 2008).
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How might these considerations be relevant to the link between anger and pro-war
attitudes? For one thing, note that the reasons one could use to justify going to war immediately
(e.g., they threatened us, we need to retaliate NOW!) are relatively simple and often have a kneejerk, tit-for-tat flavor. In contrast, the reasons that are often given for not going to war typically
involve more complex conditionalized processing (e.g., if we attack now, this could potentially
make us more vulnerable to attack). Hence, other things being equal, a shift from analytic to
heuristic processing might make it more likely that people generate pro, as opposed to anti, war
attitudes. A somewhat different way of framing this idea is that generation of anti-war attitudes
may require some degree of inhibition of relatively “primitive” impulses, such as the desire to hit
back when one is hit. However, successful inhibition requires cognitive control (i.e., is an
effortful, rather than automatic, process) and to this extent anger might tend to interfere with this
inhibitory process, making it more likely that people respond impulsively in times of war (or
impending war). In either case, the central prediction here is that the emotion of anger might
decrease cognitive control and produce greater reliance on heuristic, compared to controlled,
processing. This shift could, in and of itself, promote a greater acceptance of pro-war attitudes
for the reasons noted above.
A Brief Note on Motivation vs. Ability
The aforementioned discussion raises the question of why, exactly, anger promotes a less
systematic (i.e., more heuristic-based) style of processing. This issue is not critically important
for present purposes, but does merit brief explanation here. One possibility, stemming from the
mood as information literature (Schwarz, 1990) is that anger essentially acts as an “act now,
think later!” cue, prompting people to engage in well-learned behaviors that do not require a
great deal of cognitive thought. Put somewhat bluntly, anger is a fairly “primitive” emotion that
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is associated with relatively simple action tendencies (fighting back) and hence, the experience
of anger might be sufficient to trigger simple (heuristic) rather than analytic modes of thought.
Similarly, from an evolutionary perspective, anger may signal a dangerous/threatening
environment. In order to survive the immediate situation, action must be taken rapidly. The
need for an immediate response would most certainly require the use of a heuristic processing
strategy. Note that this explanation is a motivational account of anger, in that anger decreases
people’s motivation to engage in controlled, systematic processing.
A somewhat different explanation derives from the idea that the experience of the
emotion itself, and/or the cognitions associated with it, can act as a kind of cognitive load,
preventing people from engaging in careful, systematic processing of information (Lambert et
al., 1997; Schwarz, 1990). Note that this is an ability-based, not motivational, account.
According to this account, even if people wanted to process information carefully while they
were angry, they would (to varying degrees, depending on the intensity of anger) be impaired in
their ability to do so.
For purposes of the present studies, however, it was not especially critical whether the
link between anger and processing style is due to changes in motivation or ability. What is most
important is that the experimental induction of anger should lead to a reduction in cognitive
control, leading participants, in turn, to rely to a greater extent on heuristic-based processing.
For reasons noted above, this shift in processing style could, in and of itself, foster a greater
likelihood of people formulating pro-war attitudes. Fortunately, there are several well-established
techniques for measuring cognitive control, including a relatively simple technique recently
employed by Payne (2005), which I describe in more detail in the methodology section.
Mediation vs. Moderation
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Similar to the two proceeding hypotheses, the critical variable (here, cognitive capacity)
could play a role as a mediator, as well as a moderator. In this particular case, I was most
confident in making predictions for mediation, given the evidence pointing to the deleterious
effects of anger on cognitive control. This meditational model can be formally stated as the
possibility that the effect of anger (X) on support for war (Y) could be mediated, in part, by
changes in people’s cognitive control (Z), the latter measure to be assessed via a general measure
of control (Payne, 2005). It is also conceivable that cognitive control could act as a moderator.
Here, as in the previous two hypotheses, there could be individual differences in cognitive
control. To this extent, it seems reasonable to suppose that people who exhibit chronically low
levels of cognitive control might be more likely to show evidence of the effects of anger on
support for militaristically aggressive policies. Stated differently, it could be that the
combination of experimentally induced anger coupled with chronically low levels of cognitive
control could lead to relatively high levels of support for military conflicts.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
One way of thinking about these topics is that I am proposing that anger could affect
cognition in two key ways. In particular, anger could affect (a) what people are thinking about
as well as (b) how people are thinking. The first two hypotheses--changes in time perspective
and risk perception/preference--are examples of changes in what people are thinking about. That
is, anger may affect whether people are thinking about the future or not (cf. Experiment 1) as
well as whether they are, or are not, considering the relevant presence of risks (cf. Experiment 2).
However, anger could also affect how people are thinking about these issues, namely, the extent
to which these thoughts are dominated by controlled vs. automatic processes (cf. Experiment 3).
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Figures 1A and 1B provide a schematic summary of the preceding hypotheses. As seen in
the top figure (1A), my research assessed the validity of three distinct meditational mechanisms
that could, in theory, account for the effects of anger on pro-war attitudes. In each case, I
employed suitable measures of each of the three key constructs (time perspective, risk, cognitive
control) and used standard statistical techniques to assess mediation. In this case, differences
with respect to these three variables could moderate the extent to which the experimental
manipulation exerts an influence on the dependent variable. This possibility is schematically
illustrated in Figure 1B.
As implied by the preceding section, my primary focus was on mediation, mostly because
the predictions derived from the literature were more relevant to mediation, rather than
moderation. However, it should be emphasized that moderation is no less “important” than
mediation and that support for one or more models of moderation is likely to offer as much
insight into the present considerations as would models of mediation. Of course, as mentioned
previously, it is also possible that both mediation and moderation could occur.
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
In all three experiments, all participants first completed a battery of individual difference
measures, including standard measures of political ideology, trait anger, and trait aggression.
Following these measures, participants were randomly assigned to either the anger or the neutral
mood manipulation. At the end of all three experiments participants were presented with a
hypothetical war scenario and asked to evaluate their support for war and perceived risks of the
war. The key difference between the three experiments was which of the hypothesized
mediators of the anger--war attitudes relationship were measured.
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In theory, it might be possible to conduct a single experiment in which all relevant tests
of mediation/moderation involving all three of the relevant intervening variables (time
perspective, risk, and cognitive control) were conducted in the context of a single study.
However, a valid concern was that if participants are spending a significant amount of
time and effort on the meditational measurement tasks, this could counteract the effect of the
mood induction. If their experimentally induced moods drop back to baseline, then we would be
unable to see the emotion’s effects on the main dependent variable, attitudes towards war.
To avoid this possible problem, each proposed mechanism was measured in separate
experiments. Experiment 1 involved an experimental manipulation of anger (vs. control) and
included a measure of consideration of future consequences. Experiment 2 was the same as
Experiment 1, but instead of measuring CFC, participants completed measures of risk perception
and preference. Experiment 3 was the same as Experiments 1 and 2 except for the use of a
measure of cognitive control.

EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants and Design
A total of 116 college undergraduates (54 male, 62 female) participated in this study for
partial completion of course credit or payment of ten dollars. The design consisted of one
between-subjects factor, involving random assignment to the justice violation versus neutral
mood condition. Preliminary analyses of the data revealed seven participants with outlier scores
on key dependent variables (in all cases, +2.75 SDs above or below the mean), including (a) five
participants who had extreme responses on the anger/war attitude tasks and (b) two participants
who selected the lowest possible option when asked to rate how much effort they put into the
experiment as a whole. The 2.75 SD cut-off is based on the identification of two particular cases
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that were apart from the distribution. This cut-off allowed for these two participants to be
removed from analysis. Two additional participants were excluded, one for not following
directions, and another for demonstrating a high level of suspiciousness on the experiment. After
these exclusions, a total of 107 participants were retained in the formal analyses, 51 in the
experimental condition and 56 in the control condition. (When the aforementioned participants
were not excluded, analyses revealed a pattern that was very similar to, but somewhat weaker
than, the results reported ahead.)
Schematic Overview of Design
Because of the complexity of the design and multitude of measures pertaining to different
theoretical issues, some readers may wish to consult a schematic summary of the various
measures and tasks to be described in more detail ahead. This summary is presented in Figure 2.
Assessment of Individual Differences
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were escorted to separate cubicles.
Participants first completed a battery of individual difference questionnaires, briefly summarized
below. (For the sake of expositional clarity, I do not list all of the items in each individual
difference variable in the discussion to follow; see Appendix A for a complete list of all items in
each scale.)
Trait anger/aggression. The first two set of scales assessed chronic (trait-based)
measures of aggression or anger. The first of these was Spielberger’s (1985) 13-item trait-anger
scale. This scale contained items such as “I am a hotheaded person” and “I have a fiery temper”
while using a Likert response scale of 1 (almost never) to 9 (almost always). Two items that are
normally used in this scale were not included because they were state rather than trait measures
of anger (“I feel irritated; I feel angry”). A composite index of trait anger was formed on the
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basis of an average of all 13 items (alpha = .83). Participants next completed Buss and Perry’s
(1992) trait aggression scale, in which participants were asked to respond to 14 items along a
scale ranging from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 9 (extremely characteristic of me). An
average of these items yielded an overall index of trait aggression (alpha = .84). As one might
expect, the aforementioned measure of trait anger was significantly correlated with scores on this
index of trait aggression (r = .54, p < .001). However, I included both measures in light of
previous theory and research suggesting that trait anger and trait aggression are correlated, but
theoretically distinct, constructs. See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations of constructs
in Experiments 1 – 3.
Sensation seeking. Next, participants completed Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch,
and Donohew’s (2002) Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS). As noted in the introduction,
sensation seeking is a personality variable related to risk-taking. Research also suggests that
sensation seeking may be associated with a tendency to not think about the future (i.e. be focused
on the present; Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003). The BSSS employed a Likert-type
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree); a composite measure was formed on the
basis of all 8 items in the scale (alpha = .82).
Political attitudes. Participants then completed a series of scales to assess their preexisting political attitudes. They first completed a 12-item measure of political orientation. Each
participant’s favorability towards liberalism and conservatism was assessed by presenting the
two statements “I consider myself to be politically liberal (conservative)” with a response scale
of 1 (very much disagree) to 9 (very much agree) for both (Conover & Feldman, 1981). These
types of ideology measures have been a strong predictor of voting behavior and a wide variety of
political attitudes (Jost, 2006). In the political science and political psychology literature,
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political orientation is usually divided into two dimensions: Economic and Moral ideology
(Feldman, 2003). Therefore, in addition to the two broad items of political orientation described
above, participants also responded to four questions regarding their views towards political
economics (“The U.S. government already spends too much giving money to the poor”) and three
items on political morality (“I support full legalization of homosexual marriage”). Recent
research has also indicated a third dimension called “tough-mindedness” which consists of
political attitudes towards militarism, crime, and immigration (Young, 2009). Three items were
included to assess trait attitudes towards this dimension (“The death penalty should be eliminated
from the American Justice System”). These political orientation measures consisted of a total of
12 items and were averaged for a reliability alpha of .72.
Participants next completed measures of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth & Male, 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988).
These are by far two of the most common political attitude measures used in the literature
presently. SDO is an attitudinal orientation regarding intergroup relations. More specifically,
SDO measures whether one generally prefers group relations to be hierarchical rather than equal.
Scale items include, “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups” and
“All groups should be given an equal chance in life”. RWA is a personality variable containing
three main factors: conventionalism, aggression towards outgroups, and submission to
authorities. Items on the RWA scale include “The established authorities generally turn out to be
right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off
their ignorance”. Participants completed a shortened version of the RWA scale to limit the
reduction in participants’ attentional abilities that may occur during the experiment. Both
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measures used a response scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Both indices had
excellent reliabilities (SDO, α = .91; RWA, α = .88).
Assessment of Baseline Mood
In addition to the aforementioned individual difference variables, mood was also assessed
before the mood manipulation. The purpose of this task was to provide an initial “baseline” level
of mood. This was accomplished using a modified Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS)
(Watson & Tellegen, 1988). (The modification in question simply reflects the fact that I
included a wider range of mood queries than is typically included on the PANAS.) In this task,
participants were presented with adjectives describing a particular mood (e.g., angry, pleased).
For each of the mood adjectives participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt that
affective state at that moment, along a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). The
full set of adjectives included the following 25 randomly presented adjectives: interested, bored,
edgy, happy, alert, irritated, satisfied, mad, upset, tense, sad, pleased, relaxed, unhappy, angry,
determined, irate, dejected, anxious, comfortable, jittery, nervous, worried, confident, calm.
Correlation Among Individual Difference Variables
It is useful to provide a preliminary indication of how all of the various individual
difference variables were related to one another. As seen in Table 2, the three political measures
(Political Orientation, SDO, RWA) all correlated with each other significantly. Interestingly,
sensation seeking was positively related to trait aggression, but was non-significantly negatively
associated with trait anger. Of the political ideology measures, only social dominance was
significantly related to trait aggression at the .05 alpha level. However, both SDO and RWA (but
not Political Orientation) were significantly related to Trait Anger.
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Baseline state emotions were strongly correlated with one another. Not surprisingly, the
baseline state anger, anxiety, and sadness were all related to trait anger. The state emotion
baseline measures did not correlate with any of the other individual difference variables with the
exception of baseline anger with trait aggression and RWA.
Mood Manipulation and Measurement
After completion of the pre-measures, mood was manipulated using a procedure adapted
from a widely-used method initially developed by Strack and his colleagues (Strack, Schwarz, &
Gschneidinger, 1985; see also Lambert et al. 1997; 2010). Half of the participants were randomly
assigned to an anger induction condition. This induction consisted of two sections. In the first
section, participants were asked to “think about an event in your life in which you were treated
extremely unfairly. In your response, describe what actually happened in as much vivid detail as
you can”. Participants were given a blank space (taking up approximately three fourths of one page)
to write their response. On the next page, participants were given the following additional
instructions: “Now we would like you to focus more specifically on how this event makes you feel.
Please include any and all aspects of your own internal reactions, including thoughts, emotions, as
well as any physiological changes (e.g., changes in heart rate). Please focus both on (a) how the
event made you feel at the time the event initially occurred as well as (b) how this event makes you
feel right now”. As in the first part, participants were given a blank space, consisting of three
fourths of a page, to write their response. Completion of this task generally took between 10 and 15
minutes.
The other half of the participants were assigned to a neutral mood condition (or, more
precisely, a non-manipulated/baseline, mood condition). In this group, participants were asked to
write about the mundane details of an average day in their life. This task took about the same
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amount of time as the angry mood induction, i.e. approximately 10-15 minutes. Following the mood
manipulation task, all participants returned to the computer and completed the same PANAS task
that had been given as a pre measure.
Formation of Mood Composites
Composites of specific emotions were created based on principal components analysis. The
index of anger was created using the items mad, angry, irate, upset (α = .93). In addition, I also
formed a composite index of anxiety (anxious, fearful, worried nervous; α = .86), and sadness (sad,
unhappy; α = .81). Two parallel sets of composites were formed, one for the baseline measure and
another for the assessment of mood immediately after the experimental manipulation. The
composition of each index was the same in both cases. For example, the four specific items that
were used to construct the baseline measure of anger were the same as those used to construct the
post-manipulation index of anger. As one might expect given their identical composition and
administration within a short period of time, each of the pairings of mood indices (e.g. pre vs. postmeasures of anger) were strongly correlated with one another. The intercorrelations between the
post manipulation mood indices are presented in Table 3.
Assessment of Consideration of Future Consequences
As described in the introduction, temporal orientation was operationalized in terms of the
12-item Consideration of Future Consequences scale (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, &
Edwards, 1994). The CFC scale contained response options of 1 (not at all how I feel right now)
to 9 (very much how I feel right now). This scale was slightly altered from its original form so
that it was clear to readers that responses should indicate current feelings towards the items, not
their global consideration of the future and its consequences. An average of all items was used
for the CFC index (alpha = .86).
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Because of the central importance of the CFC scale to this study, it is useful to elaborate
on its role in the analyses to follow. As I noted in the introduction, an overarching objective of
the present research was to gain greater insight into “intervening” variables that might help to
explain the link between anger and changes in war attitudes. In this study, temporal orientation,
as measured by the CFC scale, could actually play two distinct roles.
First, it is possible that CFC could act as a mediator, whereby the effect of the
experimental manipulation on war attitudes could be due, in part, to changes in temporal
orientation. (Note that the meditational role of CFC would likely arise in combination with
changes in mood. Hence, technically, this would involve a “double mediation” involving
changes not only in angry mood, but temporal orientation as well.) Second, CFC could also act
as a moderator, in addition to any role it might play as a mediator. In this latter case, the effects
of the experimental manipulation on key dependent variables could depend on whether
participants score high or low on CFC. Although the combination of mediation and moderation
in the same study can sometimes be complex, the present data provided a fairly clear delineation
of these two “roles” of CFC.
War Passage
After completing the CFC scale on the computer, all participants were instructed to return
to the paper packet used previously for the mood manipulation. There, they were given
instructions to read a passage about a hypothetical military conflict involving the United States
of America, South Korea, and North Korea. They were told that although the current situation
was NOT actually happening, they should read it as if it did in fact reflect the current state of
affairs in the world today. They were asked to think about the implications of such a situation
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and what actions they believe the United States should take going forward. Participants were
given the following passage:
Washington DC. (UPDATED 5:20 pm). In a series of fast-moving events today, the
President and the U.S. Congress agreed to further talks in light of the serious situation
quickly developing involving North Korea. Senior Pentagon officials confirm that these
options include the use of military force. The current situation has escalated dramatically
over the past three weeks, and is centered on four key events. All four of these events
involve North Korea engaging in acts of aggression against the United States and South
Korea, one of the U.S’s strongest allies in the region.
Although North Korea has threatened the United States and much of Western Europe the
past months, the situation turned deadly when the American embassy in Thailand was
bombed, causing the deaths of nearly 15 people, most of which were American citizens.
All evidence provided by the C.I.A. suggests North Korean militants were responsible for
the attack. Following this attack, five Americans were kidnapped from the American
embassy in Japan and are currently being held hostage in Pyongyang, North Korea. Last
week, the U.S. shot down two North Korean spy planes flying into American air space.
Two days after the spy planes were shot down, 25 alleged North Korean spies were
arrested in and around Washington D.C. and New York City. Reports from senior
government officials indicate the captured spies had been conducting surveillance of
important U.S. sites including the Pentagon and the Capital building. The alleged spies
were caught with thousands of pictures and videos of the sites, as well as massive
amounts of bomb making materials. U.S. officials believe they were part of a large
network of North Korean militants plotting within the United States and believe more are
still at large in the U.S. During this time, the North Koreans have continued nuclear
weapon testing extending far into the pacific within 500 miles of Hawaii. The North
Korean government has denied all allegations of involvement with these events. North
Korean officials argue they cannot control the actions of a few rogue militants.
Officials believe North Korea’s actions stem from their frustration over recent sanctions
placed on the country by the United Nations. These sanctions were pushed heavily by the
U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. argued for these sanctions due to North Korea’s refusal
to end their nuclear weapons program. In recent days both the United States and North
Korea have attempted to display their military might. The U.S. sent a fleet of ships and
submarines off the coasts of North and South Korea, North Korea has responded by
conducting tests of their long-range missiles and other nuclear devices.
Beyond the United States’ hostilities towards North Korea, reports suggest that the
situation is even more serious in South Korea. Both South and North Korea have been
verbally fighting over many issues in the past. However, since the U.N. sanctions were
imposed, North Korea has called up their military and has amassed hundreds of
thousands of troops on the border between North and South Korea. American military
experts believe North Korea’s military build-up is consistent with preparations for a
massive invasion of South Korea. These same experts are especially concerned due to the
fact North Korea has the 4th largest standing army in the world. Despite diplomatic efforts
by numerous countries to convince North Korea to remove their troops from the border,
North Korea has only increased their military build-up. Reports indicate that most
intelligence agencies around the world, including the C.I.A, believe an invasion of South
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Korea by North Korea is imminent. Due to the recent attacks on the United States and
the strong possibility of the invasion of South Korea, the U.S. government is currently
contemplating how to respond.

After reading the passage, participants were given space to write down their thoughts
about the passage on the following page of the packet. The goal of this section was for
participants to consolidate and more fully develop their opinions of the content of the passage by
writing out their current feelings. In this section, participants were asked a series of questions
regarding their evaluations of the scenario they just read. They were first asked, “What are your
overall feelings towards the situation?”. After a section of writing space, participants were
prompted with the following questions: “What do you think the United States should do in this
situation? Please explain why you feel the U.S. should act in the way you described. Please be as
detailed as possible.” Participants were again given space on the page to write their response.
Assessment of War Attitudes
Upon finishing the writing task, participants were instructed to return to the computer for
additional questions. Here, participants were asked a series of questions about the war passage.
One section, which served as the main dependent variable for this study, pertained to whether
participants believed the United States should engage in a military conflict with North Korea.
Based on the results of principal components analyses, an average of the following items was
used to construct an index of attitudes towards the possibility of U.S. military action against
North Korea: Under these circumstances, the United States should immediately begin bombing
North Korea; America would be completely justified in attacking North Korea; America should
not go to war with North Korea, more diplomacy should be used to resolve the situation; It
would be a huge mistake for the United States to attack North Korea; The United States should
invade North Korea; The United States should begin to move soldiers into S. Korea in order to
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advance into North Korea; Under the current circumstances, I do not support going to war with
North Korea; The United States will look weak if they do not engage militarily with North Korea.
Reliability for this construct was excellent (alpha = .91).
Perceived War Risk
Participants also received a separate section measuring their subjective likelihood
estimates of possible outcomes that could occur if the United States were to attack North Korea
within the contexts of the hypothetical situation presented in the passage. This included items
such as, “If the United States were to attack North Korea, there would be a high probability that
the U.S. would meet its objectives”. The purpose of this measure was to assess participants’
beliefs regarding the perceived risk involved for the United States if it were to go to war with
North Korea. Someone agreeing strongly to the item listed above would presumably perceive
little risk in going to war because he or she believes a positive outcome will occur. The reliability
alpha for this construct was .67. Participants responded on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly
agree) scale for both of the war measures2.
Assessment of Demographics
Following the war measures, I collected demographic information from each participant.
Participants were asked to provide their gender, age, citizenship, and ethnicity, as well as other
related factors. Participants who replied “Asian” to the ethnicity question, were asked to specify
which Asian country(ies) they themselves are originally from, or descend from. (These more
precise questions of Asian ethnicity were deemed necessary because ethnicities of certain Asian
countries could have differentially affected attitudes towards the hypothetical war passage,
because it directly involved specific Asian countries.) After this section of demographics,
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participants were asked how easy the war scenario was to imagine, how interesting the article
was to them, and the amount of effort they gave on the task.
Summary of Methodology
To summarize, all participants began the experiment by completing a series of individual
differences measures and an assessment of their state mood. Participants were randomly assigned
to either the justice violation condition or the control condition and completed the subsequent
writing task. Next, all participants completed an additional mood assessment task. This was
followed by completing the consideration of future consequences scale and presentation of the
United States vs. North Korea military conflict passage. Participants then completed the war
attitudes and war risk measures. Lastly participants completed a series of demographic items and
a self-report of their effort on the task.
Brief Summary of Predictions
I have already discussed the predictions for this experiment along with the theoretical
assumptions on which these predictions are based. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly reiterate
the main predictions before presenting the main findings, ahead. To begin, I predicted that
participants would show more favorable (“hawkish”) views towards military engagement with N.
Korea if they had been assigned to the anger induction condition than if they were not. Anger
was expected to play a key mediator role in this effect, such that the effect of the anger induction
on these attitudes should be due to changes in angry mood. However, I predicted that changes in
temporal orientation (as assessed by scores on the CFC scale) could also play a meditational role,
over and above whatever meditational role angry mood might play. I also considered the
possibility that temporal orientation could also act as a moderator, such that the positive effect of
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the anger manipulation on war attitudes would be stronger among participants scoring low in
CFC (i.e. those who score low in future orientation) rather than those who score high.
RESULTS
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger
As predicted, participants in the justice violation condition expressed significantly higher
ratings of anger compared to those in the control condition (Ms = 3.34 vs. 1.74), F(1, 106) =
31.24, p < .001, ηp2= .23. This effect demonstrates that the justice violation manipulation had an
effect on emotions, albeit a small effect. This effect was not moderated by gender F(1, 105) =
1.11, p > .25, nor by political orientation, F(1, 105) = 0.87, p > .25.
In addition to anger (the focal emotion in this paper), analyses revealed two additional
effects, both of which were smaller (in statistical magnitude) than the effect involving anger. In
particular, there was an effect involving anxiety such that scores were higher in the experimental
condition compared to control (Ms = 2.88 vs. 2.28), F(1, 106) = 4.99, p < .05, ηp2= .05. In
addition, participants reported higher levels of sadness in the former condition compared to the
latter (Ms = 3.18 vs. 2.25), F(1, 106) = 10.05, p < .01, ηp2= .09. I believe these effects can be
seen as a side effect of the anger manipulation.
One way of demonstrating the “dominant” role of anger is to show that the effects of my
manipulation on anger remained significant, even after controlling for its shared variance with
the other mood indices2. In particular, the main effect of the experimental manipulation on the
angry mood index remained significant even after controlling for anxiety (Ms = 3.24 vs. 1.83),
F(1,103) = 25.17, p < .001 ηp2= .20. However, the effects of this manipulation on anxiety
disappeared after statistically controlling for anger (Ms = 2.64 vs 2.49), F(1,103) = .28, p > .25.
Similarly, the effect of the experimental manipulation on sadness was no longer significant after
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controlling for anger (Ms = 2.61 vs. 2.76), F(1,103) = .35, p > .25. In sum, even after controlling
for its shared variance with the other negative emotions, the experimental manipulation exerted a
significant effect on anger. However, the reverse was not true, as the effects of the manipulation
on the other negative emotions tended to be attenuated, or disappear altogether, once I controlled
for anger.
Primary Analyses
One of the first issues to arise in these analyses is whether the experimental manipulation
(justice vs. control) had a direct or indirect effect on (a) consideration of future consequences
(hereinafter, CFC) and participants’ attitudes towards war (hereinafter, war attitudes). (For the
sake of expositional brevity, I refer to the experimental condition as the “anger induction”
condition, with the understanding that this manipulation actually involved a reminder of a
personal event involving injustice.) A direct effect was tested using a one-way ANOVA, with
the null hypothesis stating there was no difference between conditions on the CFC scale or the
war attitudes scale. Neither of these analyses provided a hint of a direct effect. In particular,
scores on the CFC were nearly identical, regardless of whether participants were in the anger
induction condition or the control condition (Ms = 5.99 vs. 6.14), F(1, 107) = .38, p > .25.
Similarly, scores on war attitudes did not differ as a function of condition (Ms = 3.50 vs. 3.66),
F(1, 107) = .27, p > .25. Hence, CFC could not serve as a mediator in the conventional sense of
that term (Baron & Kenny, 1986) because the experimental manipulation did not produce any
changes in this variable in the first place. Analysis also revealed that neither CFC nor any other
variable acted as a moderator of the Condition – War attitudes association. Thus, the potential
moderation effect displayed in Figure 1B was not significant for any variable of interest.
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However, there were a number of moderators of the Anger – War attitudes relationship. These
effects are described below.
Hierarchical regression analyses revealed a marginally significant positive relationship
between Anger and War attitudes (Beta = .23, p = .09) indicating a tendency for higher levels of
angry mood to be associated with greater support for war. All regression analyses and tests for
moderation in all three experiments were conducted controlling for the variables of condition and
the baseline measure of anger, including the moderator analyses discussed below. In addition to
the moderating effects of CFC (which we shall consider presently), initial analyses revealed
several meaningful moderator effects of the anger – war attitudes association in their own right,
including those related to (a) gender, with the anger-war effect stronger for males compared to
females, (b) political ideology, with this relationship stronger for conservatives compared to
liberals, and (c) trait aggression, with the anger-war attitudes link stronger for participants
scoring high in trait aggression. Each of these analysis were conducted with only the moderator
of interest included, and did not include the other interaction effects. Details pertaining to each of
these moderator effects are provided below.
Moderator Effect #1: Gender
Analyses of war attitudes revealed an angry mood by gender interaction, B = - .33, p <
.0014. This interaction was clearly due to the fact that the relationship between anger and war
attitudes was strong for the male participants (B = .63, p < .01) whereas this relationship showed,
if anything, a small trend in the opposite direction for females (B = -.09, p > .25). The nature of
this interaction is displayed in Figure 3.
Moderator Effect #2: Political Ideology
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In addition to gender, the positive relationship between anger and war attitudes was also
moderated by the continuous variable of political orientation (B = .18, p < .05). Using the
procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991), I explored the nature of this effect by centering
all predictor variables and computing the relationship between anger and war attitudes for
participants 1 SD above, as well as 1 SD below the mean for political orientation. The relatively
more politically conservative participants in this sample had a strong positive Anger – War
support relationship (B =.43, p = .01). In contrast, the more liberal participants did not show this
effect (B = .05, p > .25). This finding is also consistent with the fact that conservatives tend to be
more “hawkish” in their evaluations of war. Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of this
interaction.
Moderator Effect #3: Trait Aggression
Pre-existing levels of trait aggression also moderated the anger and war attitudes
relationship (B = .15, p < .05). As seen in Figure 5, participants high in trait aggression revealed
a significant, positive relation between angry mood and support for war, (B = .41, p < .05). In
contrast, those who scored low on trait aggression did not show any hint of an anger – war
relationship (B = .08, p > .25).
Moderator Effect #4: CFC
Initial analyses revealed a significant CFC x Anger interaction when treating war
attitudes as the criterion variable, (B = -.19, p < .05). Participants scoring low (1 SD below the
mean) on CFC (indicating a tendency to not think about the future) displayed a significant
Anger-War relationship (B = .42, p < .01). In contrast, those at high levels (1 SD above the
mean) of the CFC scale (i.e. participants who did, in fact, have a future orientation) did not
display an association between Anger and War (B = -.04, p > .25). The nature of this relationship
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is shown in Figure 6. As seen in this figure, participants who were thinking more about
immediate consequences of military action tended to support war more as they became angrier.

Summary of Moderator Effects
As seen in the preceding sections, analysis revealed four moderators of the anger – war
relationship: gender, trait aggression, political orientation, and CFC. That is, the tendency for
anger to be related to war attitudes was contingent on four conceptually distinct variables.
Nevertheless, this raises an important question: Is it really the case that these analyses reflect the
operation of four distinct moderator effects? This sort of question is especially important to ask
whenever the moderator variables in question are correlated with one another.
As seen in Table 4, there were, in fact, some reliable relationships between some of the
moderator variables. This included a contingency of political ideology and trait aggression on
gender, such that males tended to score high in conservatism and also scored high in trait
aggression. As it turns out, however, conclusions are the same, even after taking into account
this overlap. In particular, I again tested for each of these moderator effects while controlling for
the other three moderator effects. (For example, when testing for the moderating effects of
political ideology on the relationship between anger and war attitudes, I statistically controlled
for gender, CFC, and trait aggression). This analytic approach yielded very similar conclusions,
as these analyses again yielded clear evidence for each of the four moderator effects in question.
A more formal analysis of the independence of the interaction effects is to include all
four interactions in the model simultaneously. This analysis revealed that only the gender by
anger interaction remained significant B = -.25, p < .05. Thus these interaction effects are
partially due to the role of the gender interaction effect. However, this finding does not mean that
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the other three moderates (CFC, political ideology, and trait aggression) are not important and
meaningful in their own right. Although it is clear that gender is key to understanding these
interaction effects, the individual moderators are important for understanding the anger-war
support relationship.
Mediation of Anger-War Support
Although CFC’s role as a moderator is consequential in its own right, an important
purpose of this experiment was to test CFC as a mediator of the association between anger and
war attitudes. As stated previously, because the main independent variable in this study
(experimental condition) was not related to the dependent variable, classic mediational analyses
following recommendations from Baron and Kenny (1986) were not possible. However, recent
research on variable mediation demonstrates that indirect effects can still be theoretically
meaningful and important even without meeting the preconditions stipulated by Baron and
Kenny. Specifically, a significant “total effect” in which the main dependent variable (in this
case, war support) is regressed upon the independent variable (condition) is not necessary to
interpret meaningful indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Rucker, Preacher,
Tormala, & Petty, 2011). In this particular case, I was interested in testing whether the effect of
the experimental manipulation on war attitudes was mediated in serial fashion, first by anger, and
then by CFC. (schematically, experimental manipulation  anger (M1)  CFC (M2) 
war attitudes). As with any other test of mediation, the viability of this process depends, of
course, on the presence of reliable relationships at each step of the proposed pathway. Prior to
formal tests of mediation, therefore, it is useful to first determine if such relationships do, in fact,
exist.
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The nature of these relationships is shown in Figure 7. All analyses were conducted
controlling for condition and baseline anger in each step. One aspect of this figure, the
significant relationship between the experimental manipulation and anger (Beta = .43, p < .001),
simply confirms the implications of the preceding analyses. However, there was not a significant
relationship between anger and CFC, (Beta = -.08, p > .25), even though there was a negative
relationship between CFC and war attitudes (Beta = -.20, p < .05). This CFC – War attitudes
relationship holds when including all prior variables (pre-measure of anger, post measure of
anger and condition) in the model as predictors. Because each pathway is not significant, CFC
does not appear to be a mediator of the Anger – War relationship using this full data set.
Separate Mediational Analyses for Males and Females
My primary analyses showed that males were displaying a stronger relationship between
anger and attitudes toward war. Hence, it seemed prudent to test for the possibility of mediation
for each gender group separately.
Male participants only. As seen in Figure 8, condition again had a strong effect on
reported anger (Beta = .36, p < .001). Next, anger and CFC were only marginally significantly
related (Beta = -.43, p = .06). Interestingly, CFC and war attitudes were significantly associated
with one another (Beta = -.30, p < .05). Analyses also revealed a significant relationship between
anger and war support (Beta = .63, p < .01) for this male-only data set. Most important, formal
tests of mediation using Hayes’ (in press) PROCESS bootstrapping procedure did not actually
yield significant support for the proposed multiple mediation. The confidence interval for the
indirect effect was (-.051, .469) (For a complete discussion of the PROCESS model see Hayes,
in press, or Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The failure to find strong evidence for mediation in this
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case is likely due to the fact that one of the critical relationships (anger  CFC) was not actually
significant at the .05 alpha level.
Another way of conducting these regression analyses is to include all prior variables
beyond the manipulation into the model as predictors at each step of the path analysis. Since
condition is already included at each step, the only difference in this technique and the above
procedure is the inclusion of anger as a predictor variable in the CFC – War support analysis. For
the full data set, the CFC – War relationship remains significant, Beat = -.19, p = .05. However,
for males only, the inclusion of post-manipulation anger does lessen this effect, and makes it non
significant at the .05 alpha level, Beta = -.20, p = .16. This finding indicates that anger plays an
important role in the CFC – War relationship for males. The implications of this are described
further in the discussion section.
Female participants only.
The relationships among and between the various pathways for the female participants is
shown in Figure 9. None of these regression coefficients were significant for the relevant
pathways for female participants.
DISCUSSION
One of the overriding goals of Experiment 1 was to understand how time orientation may
play a role when examining the relationship between anger and war attitudes. In this study, time
orientation was assessed by the Consideration of Future Consequences scale (CFC). I consider
two roles that CFC could have played in the current context, as both a mediator as well as
moderator. In the sections to follow, I shall discuss the implications of my data for these issues
in turn.
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Support for Mediation
Results did not generate any strong evidence for formal mediation, although the data did
provide a hint of such effects for the male participants (see Figure 8). Given that the observed
relationships are consistent with predictions, it would be useful to consider whether future
research would be able to replicate these interesting (albeit weak) effects, at least for males. It
should also be kept in mind that the regression analyses described above did, in fact, reveal a
significant relationship between CFC and war attitudes. To my knowledge, this is the first study
to demonstrate this relationship. Although these findings should be taken with a great deal of
caution, they do suggest that time orientation—as measured by CFC—may be an important
factor for understanding the relationship between anger and war. Apart from its role as a
mediator, recall also that CFC did, in fact, emerge as a significant moderator of the relationship
between anger and war attitudes.
Support for Moderation
It should be kept in mind at the outset that a test of moderation is asking a question that is
different from that of mediation. Unlike mediation (which is asking questions about changes in
the proposed mediator), moderation does not actually presume that the moderator variable is
changing at all. Rather, moderation is asking whether different processes are occurring at
different “levels” of the proposed moderator.
My results did, in fact, show evidence of moderation involving CFC. In particular, the
nature of the relationship between anger and war attitudes was different, depending on the
chronic time orientation of the participants. Participants scoring low in CFC--those focused
more on the present--became more supportive of war the angrier they became. In contrast, this
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relationship did not emerge among participants scoring high in CFC, who were focused more on
the future. Thus, CFC appears to be a boundary condition fort the anger-war effect.
Future research will be needed to fully understand the role of CFC in this dynamic, but it
is possible that future orientation serves, in essence, to inhibit what would otherwise be a strong
relationship between anger and attitudes towards war. In particular, participants who were high
in CFC--and thus focused on future consequences of their actions—might have been able to
inhibit these anger-produced cognitions. For this reason, therefore, anger did not lead to a change
in war attitudes.
It is not entirely clear what this inhibition process consists of. Although we know that
participants scoring high in CFC are thinking about future consequences to a greater extent
generally speaking, we do not know what details they are thinking about. High CFC individuals
are not necessarily thinking more than others, they are just thinking differently. CFC is a
somewhat vague construct, and thus it is difficult to know what it is they are considering, in this
particular circumstance, that does not allow anger to have the effect on their beliefs about war.
That being said, it is likely that high CFC participants were more cognizant of some of the
potentially negative long-term consequences of engaging in war. Future research should more
precisely ask participants to list the positives and negatives of each side of the argument for both
the long term and short term. I shall discuss this and other related issues in more detail in the
General Discussion section.

Other Moderator Effects
Aside from the moderating role of CFC, Experiment 1 revealed three moderators of the
relationship between anger and war attitudes: political orientation, trait aggression, and gender.
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For political orientation, conservatives had a stronger anger and war attitudes relationship
than liberals. Note that this is not merely saying that conservatives show more positivity for war
than liberals. This finding indicates that for conservatives, as anger increases, support for war
also increases, whereas liberals’ support for war is not affected by their current anger state. Other
similar research has not found differences in political orientation for the anger – war attitudes
relationship (Lambert et al., 2010). Because political orientation appears to be a factor in
particular circumstances, future research should attempt to understand the boundary conditions
for this effect.
Trait aggression also moderated the relationship between anger and war. Results
indicated that individuals high in trait aggression became more pro war as their anger increased.
For people low in trait aggression, anger had little to no effect on their war attitudes. This finding
suggests that for these individuals who are generally not very aggressive people, increasing their
anger does not make them any more inclined to support aggressive acts such as military
engagement. However, for people who are dispositionally more aggressive, experiencing anger
likely amplifies those aggressive tendencies. Because war provides an avenue for acting
aggressively, the increase in anger leads to an increase in support for war.
For gender, it was the male participants who showed a positive relationship between
anger and war. Females did showed a slight, but non-significant negative trend in the opposite
direction. Research has shown that males are more likely to become physically aggressive
(Eagley & Steffen, 1986), violent (Smith & Visher, 1980), and support war more than females
(McDonald, Navarette, & Van Vugt, 2011). So, it is not surprising that males would support war
with North Korea in the present example more than females. It is interesting, however, that war
support for females was not affected by increased anger. Past studies pertaining specifically to
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the relationship between anger and war have found that both males and females support war at
higher levels when they are angry. Researchers interested in the anger – war effect should
explore the particular conditions in which males and females differ in the way their attitudes
towards war are affected by anger.
To summarize, three variables outside of CFC—gender, political ideology, and trait
aggression moderated the strength of the relationship between anger and war attitudes. Although
these are distinct effects, there is a common link binding them together: In each case, the
strongest relationship between anger and war attitudes emerged among those participants who
were already predisposed to support aggressive, hawkish policies. In the case of gender, there is
a wealth of evidence showing that men (vs. women) tend to be more supportive of “aggressive”
policies and my results show that the anger-war attitudes link was stronger for men. Similar,
there is a great deal of data showing that conservatives (vs. liberals) tend to be relatively more
supportive of aggressive policies and my data show that the anger-war attitudes link was stronger
for conservatives. Finally, people high (vs. low) in trait aggression would, for somewhat obvious
reasons, be more comfortable with the use of force in such context, and my data show that the
anger-attitude link was stronger for participants high in trait aggression. In other words, the
stronger link between anger and support for war tended to emerge when the psychological
makeup of the participant was conducive to the use of force in the first place.

EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 provided evidence that suggested that consideration of future consequences
is affected by anger and helps to explain anger’s causal impact on attitudes towards war. The
focus of Experiment 2 was to test for another potential causal mechanism, risk.
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As noted earlier, I make an important conceptual distinction between two elements of
risk: risk perception and risk preference. To reiterate, risk perception is an individual’s
subjective belief that a particular positive or negative event will occur. Stated another way, it is
the degree of risk that is believed to be involved in a particular situation. When measuring risk
perception, I was interested in how much risk and pessimism participants currently perceive in
their lives. Risk preference, on the other hand, refers to one’s willingness to engage in a
particular behavior that carries potentially negative consequences. Risk preference tasks measure
participants’ desire to engage in risky behaviors.
Previous research suggests that experiencing anger causes individuals to perceive less
risk in a given situation. I predicted that this decrease in perceptions of risk would cause
individuals to perceive less potential risk in a given war scenario, and therefore lead people to be
more willing to support going to war. Feeling angry has also been associated with a tendency to
take more risks. I hypothesized that this increased preference for risk would also cause
individuals to be supportive of war, despite its inherent risks. I predicted that both risk perception
and risk preference would act as mediators or moderators of the anger-war attitudes relationship.

METHOD
Participants and Design
A total of 144 college undergraduates (60 male, 82 female; two participants failed to
report their gender) participated in Experiment 2 for partial completion of course credit or $10.
The present experiment consisted of two between-subjects factors. The first factor was whether
participants were randomly assigned to the justice violation or the neutral mood condition. The
second factor was the order in which they received the war attitude measurement and the war
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likelihood estimates. In this sample, preliminary analyses of the data revealed four subjects with
outlier scores on important variables (all of which had scores +2.75 SDs above or below the
mean) including three with extreme scores on the mood task and one with the lowest possible
score of self-reported effort. After exclusions were made, a total of 140 participants were used
for formal analyses with 67 in the experimental condition and 73 in the control condition.
All aspects of Experiment 2 were identical to that of Experiment 1, save for the
measurement of risk, the proposed mediator/moderator which is described in the following
section.
Assessment of Risk
Following the post manipulation mood measurement, all participants were given tasks to
assess their risk perception and measure their preference for risk-seeking versus risk aversive
decisional responses. The risk perception task consisted of likelihood estimates of various
positive and negative life events related to the self. Participants were presented with events such
as “I acquired the flu” and “I married someone wealthy” and asked to rate the probability of that
event happening to them in their lifetime on a 1 (extremely unlikely to happen to me) to 9
(extremely likely to happen to me) scale. This risk preference construct had a reliability of .74.
As noted earlier, there are several ways of measuring risk, but subjective estimates of likelihood
represent a fairly common approach (Weinstein, 1980; Fischoff et al., 2005; Lerner & Keltner,
2001) and are also less likely to produce some of the extreme skewing problems associated with
questions that require participants to literally generate probabilities between 0 and 100. See
Appendix A for a complete list of risk perception items.
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Following this, participants were given three items to measure risk preference. The first
task was based on the common “Asian Disease Problem” originally implemented by Kahneman
and Tversky (1981). In this task, participants were given the following scenario:
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual toxic5 disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as
follows.
Program A: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
Program B: If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Participants’ first measure of risk preference was to make a choice between Program A
and Program B. To obtain a more precise measurement of their program preference, participants
were also given a Likert scale with options ranging from 1 (I find Program A more attractive) to
7 (I find Program B more attractive). This paradigm was originally used as a part of the
measurement of the effects of framing gains and losses on decision-making and risk preference.
Although framing effects of potential gains and losses are not of concern in the present study,
this method was used because it was a valid measure of risk preference in the often cited paper
by Lerner and Keltner (2001).
Two additional scenarios were provided to measure risk preference. These two items
were successfully implemented by Raghunathan and Pham (1999) in their study of the effects of
sadness and anxiety on risky decision-making. One task presented participants with two
gambles: Gamble A, which offered a 60% chance of winning $5 and Gamble B, which offered a
30% chance of winning $10. Similar to the response options in the first risk preference task,
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participants were asked to circle “A” if they prefer Gamble A, and “B” if they favored Gamble
B. Next, participants were given a scale to evaluate the respective gambles with a response scale
of 1 (I find Gamble A more attractive) to 7 (I find Gamble B more attractive). After the gamble
task, participants were presented with an employment selection situation. Here, they were told to
imagine they were recently hired for two separate jobs, and that they must only choose one. Job
A was described as having a “High salary, with low job security” and Job B was described as
having “Average salary with high job security”. As in the other two tasks, participants were
asked to make a forced choice between Job A and Job B and were then given a scale with the
response options of 1 (I find Job A more attractive) to 7 (I find Job B more attractive).
All three of these scenarios contain one option with higher risk and one with lower risk.
The higher risk options all contain relatively higher rewards but with lower probabilities of
success. For example, in the Asian Disease Problem, Program B offers a high reward in that all
600 individuals could be saved. It has a lower chance of occurring (1/3) than the other available
option (2/3). Thus, participants who were willing to make behavioral choices with higher risk
were more likely to favor these riskier options (Program B, Job A, Gamble B).
In some research paradigms, it might be useful to form an overall composite measure of
risk preference. However, such an approach presumes that all of the relevant measures correlate
with one another. In some cases, the different measures of risk preference may actually be
tapping relatively independent (i.e. largely uncorrelated) aspects of risk. In this latter case, it is
more appropriate to analyze each measure of risk preference separately (i.e. not form an overall
composite).
The latter approach clearly was more appropriate here. This can be easily seen by the
fact that none of the three measures of risk preference were actually correlated with one another.
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(The highest correlation among the three items were that between Job and Gamble items, r = .14,
p = .10.) Hence, because each item appears to be tapping into a unique domain of risk
preference, each of the three measures was used separately as their own assessment of risk
preference. This method would increase type I error and would require a correction. However,
none of these individual measures were found to be related to the experimental condition, or
anger (all ps > .15) and thus they are not discussed further.
Predictions
I predicted that participants in the angry mood manipulation condition would show
greater support for war with N. Korea in the hypothetical scenario than those in the neutral mood
condition. In addition, anger’s causal impact on support for war would be mediated by
perceptions of risk and/or risk preferences. Anger should cause a decrease in perceptions of risk.
People then would perceive less risk in the war scenario, and thus become more willing to
support war. Also, feeling angry should make people more risk-taking, and therefore be more
supportive of engaging in military conflict with North Korea.
RESULTS
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger
Participants in the anger induction condition expressed significantly higher ratings of
anger compared to those in the control condition (Ms = 2.85 vs. 1.57), F(1, 139) = 30.40, p <
.001, ηp2= .18. This finding, which is similar to that obtained in Experiment 1, again verifies that
the experimental induction had its intended effects. The effect was not moderated by gender F(1,
138) = 6.68, p > .25, or political orientation, F(1, 138) = .87, p >.25. Unlike Experiment 1, the
manipulation did not significantly affect levels of anxiety (Ms = 2.60 vs. 2.31), F(1,139) = 1.32,
p >.25. However, levels of sadness did differ as a function of condition, with higher levels of
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sadness in the anger induction condition compared to control (Ms = 2.99 vs. 1.92), F(1,139) =
16.52, p = .001, ηp2= .11. Unlike Experiment 1, the assumptions of the analysis of covariance
were met for both anxiety as well as sadness, and analyses indicated that the effects of the
experimental manipulation on anger remained reliable, even after controlling for these two
emotions, (adjusted Ms = 2.62 vs. 1.79), F(1,137) = 16.85, p = .001, ηp2= .11. In addition, no
effects of the manipulation on anxiety or sadness were found after controlling for anger (all ps
were not significant).
Primary Analyses
Analyses revealed that the experimental condition did not have a significant effect on risk
perception, risk preference, war attitudes, or perceptions of risk associated with the North Korea
conflict. Thus, aside from anger, there were no direct effects of the anger condition on the key
variables of the study. First, I tested if anger and war attitudes were causally related. Analysis
showed the relationship was in the expected positive direction, but was not statistically
significant (Beta = .12, p = .26). With this sample, gender did not moderate the effect and there
were no clear differences between males and females in the strength of the relationship. This was
somewhat surprising, given the large gender effects found in Experiment 1. None of the other
trait variables moderated the association of anger and war attitudes. In addition, anger was not
related to attitudes in perceived risks associated with war.
As with Experiment 1, the intervening variable in the present experiment, risk perception,
was tested separately for both moderation and mediation of the anger and war attitudes
relationship. Analyses showed that risk perception did, in fact, moderate the relationship between
anger and war attitudes, B = .31, p < .05. However, the nature of this moderator effect was not
what I had predicted. I had anticipated that there would be a strong positive correlation between
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anger and war attitudes (i.e. more anger predicting more pro-war attitudes), provided that
participants manifested low perceptions of risk. In fact, the exact opposite happened. In
particular, participants scoring high in risk perception (1 SD above the mean) tended to show
strong associations between anger and war attitudes, B = .34, p < .05. In contrast, participants
who perceived low amounts of risk (1 SD below the mean) showed a non-significant negative
relationship between anger and war, B = -.17, p > .25. Hence, it was the participants who saw
the world as a risky place who showed the strong association between anger and pro-war
attitudes. I had anticipated, however, that this effect would mostly emerge among participants
who saw the world in relatively non-risky terms.
To understand if risk perception had any indirect effects on the main variables of interest,
I conducted further regression analyses similar to the path analyses presented in Experiment 1,
with risk perception replacing Consideration of Future Consequences as the intervening variable
in this analysis. First, condition and anger were again strongly related, Beta = .46, p < .001
Analyses showed that anger and risk perception were marginally related Beta = .18, p = .10.
However, the effect’s direction is opposite of what was predicted. Anger was predicted to cause
lower levels of risk perception; however in this experiment anger has a small tendency to cause
higher levels of perceived risk (see ahead in the discussion section for a further analysis and
commentary on this issue). Next, I examined the relationship between risk perception and war
attitudes. This analysis showed no significant relationship between perceptions of risk and
attitudes towards U.S. involvement in a war against North Korea, Beta = -.08, p > .25. This also
was counter to predictions, which stated that low levels of risk perception would lead to higher
levels of support for war. For the sake of completion, I present, in Figure 10, the full set of these
regression coefficients. Analysis using the PROCESS serial multiple mediation procedure from
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Experiment 1, confirmed the null effects and showed that risk perception did not act as a
mediating variable, CI.95 = (-.142, .012).

DISCUSSION
Experiment 2’s finding that increased anger was not significantly associated with lower
perceptions of risk or higher preference for risk was indeed surprising. This was unexpected
because Experiment 2 was based partially on the findings of the widely-cited article by Lerner
and Keltner (2001) on emotion and risk. In their study, they found that anger was associated with
lower levels of risk perception and higher levels of risk preference. Although there are a number
of key features that differentiate the Lerner and Keltner study and my experiment, none provide a
clear explanation for the difference in results.
A Closer Look at the Lerner and Keltner (2001) Paradigm
In their first experiment Lerner and Keltner (2001) found a significant correlation
between anger and risk preference. The present study and Lerner and Keltner both used the
Asian Disease problem as a measure of risk preference. However, for anger, Lerner used a
dispositional measure of anger. My main operationalization of anger is a state measure using an
expanded version of the PANAS. However, I also measured trait anger with a measure similar to
the one used by Lerner and Keltner (2001; Spielberger, 1985). In the present study, neither the
trait nor state measures of anger were related to scores on the risk preference measure.
Lerner conducted three additional studies that investigated anger and risk perception. All
three studies used a variant of the risk perception measure utilized in the present study. This
measure was the Weinstein (1980) likelihood estimates task, in which participants state how
likely they expected a given negative or positive life event to happen to them (i.e. “Graduating in
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top third of class”). For anger, two of their studies used a version of the Spielberger trait anger
scale whereas one study used a state anger measure (responses to the term “angry” and “mad”)
after an anger manipulation. This latter study was clearly the most similar to what was used in
the present Experiment 2, yet their study found a significant anger-risk preference relationship,
and the present study did not. However, in my study, one measure of anger is in fact negatively
associated with risk perceptions as predicted. Using the state pre-measure of anger, analysis
found a significant relationship, B = -.17, p < .05, (controlling for state pre-measures of sadness
and anxiety, B = -.26, p = .01). It is unclear why this baseline state anger measure, and not the
post manipulation anger measure, was related to risk preference.
In addition, a recent dissertation by Lane (2012) also found inconsistent evidence of an
anger-risk perception effect. In this paper, participants’ levels of anger and risk perceptions of
terrorism were measured at three time points: two weeks, one year, and three years after the 9/11
attacks. Lane found anger and risk perception to be significantly negatively related in two of the
three time points, but only when controlling for anxiety and sadness. Thus, in this study, the
anger – risk perception effect seems to be somewhat inconsistent and only occurring when
controlling for other negative emotions. One possible explanation of these diverging results is
that the anger – risk preference/perception effect is actually quite small and inconsistent.
These failures to replicate do not invalidate the previously published studies. However, it
does call into question the size and consistency of the effect. Future research should investigate
the anger and risk relationships to better understand the conditions in which the relationship is
found and the size and validity of the effect. One limitation to this study that may have affected
risk perception scores is that the order of the likelihood estimates and the risky choice tasks was
not counterbalanced. It is possible that completion of the likelihood estimates affected the
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manner in which participants responded to the risk preference items. In particular, some of the
negative life events (contracting a venereal disease, getting lung cancer) may have made serious
negative consequences salient, and thus caused people to respond in a manner that was less risky.
However, this issue would not affect likelihood estimates and therefore not provide an
explanation of why the anger - risk perception relationship did not replicate past studies.
Experiment 2 did produce a surprising finding as part of risk perception’s moderating
effect on anger – war support. Here, people with high levels of risk perception became more prowar as they became angrier, and people scoring low in risk perception did not have a significant
anger – war effect. This is surprising because people with high risk perception are people who
tend to see a great deal of risk in given situations. Thus, I predicted that these would be the type
of people who would see an unacceptable amount of risk in going to war with North Korea, and
their anger would not affect their war attitudes because of these concerns about the riskiness of
the situation. Likewise, people who do not see much risk should have their war attitudes
increased by the experience of anger. I do not have a clear explanation for this effect. One
possibility is that high risk perceivers actually thought there was more risk in not going to war, as
the threat from North Korea seemed too strong. Future research should continue to explore the
role of risk in anger and war support, especially by using different types of war scenarios that
vary on their amount of risk.

EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 investigated what people were thinking, whereas Experiment 3 was
concerned with how people were thinking. That is, the final study was concerned with the
possibility that the activation of anger might decrease the probability that people engage in
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controlled processing. This possibility is important because it suggests another possible
underlying mechanism that could explain the anger and war attitudes relationship.
In particular, I hypothesized that one reason people support governments’ engaging in
war is because they are experiencing decreased cognitive control and are using shallow
processing to consume war-relevant information. More specifically, people are not thinking
carefully and systematically about some of the negative, future outcomes of war such as civilian
and military casualties and monetary costs. In addition, I hypothesized that this shallow
processing style is a consequence of experiencing anger. In order to test these assumptions I used
the anger manipulation presented in the previous two studies and measured cognitive control
through an antisaccade paradigm. Although Experiment 3 had the drawback of being the most
exploratory of the three studies, it also had the most potential of producing results that would
expand our understanding of anger’s effects on war attitudes and anger’s effects on cognitive
functioning in general.
METHOD
Participants and Design
In Experiment 3, 127 subjects (61 males, 65 females, one participant did not report
gender) participated for partial completion of course credit or $10 in payment. The present
experiment consisted of one between-subjects factor: whether participants were randomly
assigned to the justice violation or the neutral mood condition. Preliminary analyses of the data
resulted in eight participant exclusions. Two participants were removed for extreme scores
(+2.75 SDs of the above or below the mean). One was an outlier on the antisaccade measure and
another on the self-reported effort task. Six additional participants were not included for
noncompliance including (a) two participants who did not follow instructions on the writing
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tasks, (b) three who did not follow instructions on the antisaccade task and (c) one who refused
to complete the experiment. In total, 119 subjects (59 in the control condition and 60 in the
experimental condition) were used for analysis.
All aspects of Experiment 3 were identical to that of Experiment 1, save for the
measurement of cognitive control, the proposed mediator/moderator that is discussed in the
following section.
Assessment of Cognitive Control
Cognitive control was measured using an antisaccade task (Everling & Fischer, 1998;
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Payne, 2005). Each trial of the antisaccade task
contained three parts: a fixation point, a cue, and a target. Trials began with a fixation point
appearing in the middle of the screen for 2,000 ms. After the fixation point disappeared, the cue
(a red circle) appeared in one of two possible locations: the left side of the screen or the right
side. The cue was present for a total of 400 ms. Following the cue, the target then also appeared
on either the left or right side of the screen. The target was either an “H” or a “T” and was
present for 60 ms6. After the 60 ms elapsed, a pound symbol appeared and acted as a mask for
the target. For each trial, participants were asked to respond by indicating if they saw an H or a T
as quickly as possible. Each participant’s number of errors was the main dependent variable for
the task.
Participants completed two blocks. The first block was the “prosaccade” block. In this
block, the target always appeared on the same side as the cue. However in block 2 (the
“antisaccade” block) the target always appeared on the opposite side of the cue. Each block
contained 48 trials for a total of 96 trials.
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The logic behind the task is that participants focus their attention on the cue based on an
automatic orienting response to stimuli on the screen. With attention drawn to one particular side
of the screen, their ability to accurately identify the target is either facilitated or hindered. When
the position of the cue and target are congruent, performance is facilitated because participants
are already attending to the side of the screen in which the target appears. However, when the
target is presented on the opposing side of the cue, the cue acts as a distracter. On these trials, the
cue hinders one’s ability to view and accurately identify the target because attending to the cue
means one must quickly shift attention to the other side of the screen to view the target. The
presentation speed of the cue is fast enough to where shifting attention and still accurately
identifying the target is quite difficult. In order to provide an accurate response, the optimal
strategy is for participants to resist attending to the cue. However, this is difficult because people
have an automatic orienting response towards viewing an object as it appears on the screen (in
this case, the cue). This ability to override one’s impulse to attend to the cue and thus wait for the
target to appear in order to view and accurately identify the target is the measure of cognitive
control. Because performance on block 1 is presumed to be independent of cognitive control
levels, errors on block 2 served as the main dependent variable of cognitive control in this
experiment.
Predictions
I predicted participants who complete the angry mood manipulation would show more
positivity towards military engagement with North Korea in the hypothetical scenario than those
in the neutral mood condition. Anger’s effects on war support would be mediated by scores on
the cognitive control measure. Those who evidence limited cognitive control (high numbers of
errors) will be more supportive of the war than participants who have higher cognitive control
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(low numbers of errors). This is because limited cognitive control indicates an inability to inhibit
the use of shallow, heuristic-based information processing style, and an inability to override the
“primitive” aggressive urges brought on by the experience of anger. Using this heuristic
processing style and not inhibiting these aggressive tendencies would lead participants to not
think carefully or comprehensively about the factors related to the war scenario. This lack of
inhibition and detailed processing would then lead to higher support for military conflict with
North Korea.
RESULTS
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, analysis of variance revealed that participants in the
justice violation condition reported higher levels of anger than participants in the control
condition, (Ms = 3.54 vs. 1.81), F(1, 118) = 30.46, p < .001, ηp2= .21. The effect of condition on
anger was not moderated by either gender F(1,117) = 0.08, p > .25 or political orientation
F(1,117) = 1.00, p > .25. For Experiment 3, the experimental condition did not affect anxiety
ratings, (Ms = 2.95 vs. 2.52), F(1,118) = 1.95, p = .17. However, participants in the justice
violation condition had higher ratings of sadness (Ms = 3.30 vs. 2.32), F(1,118) = 7.74, p < .01,
ηp2= .06. As with the previous experiments, I tested the effects of the manipulation on both anger
and sadness while including the other relevant negative emotions as covariates. An ANCOVA
with anger as the dependent variable and anxiety as a covariate7 showed that condition still had a
significant effect on anger (Ms = 3.42 vs. 1.93), F(1,117) = 30.86, p < .001, ηp2= .21. However,
there was no significant difference between the control condition and the justice violation
condition on sadness when controlling for anger and anxiety (Ms = 2.71 vs. 2.92), F(1,116) =
0.62, p > .25. Replicating the previous two experiments, in Experiment 3, when controlling for
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the other negative emotions, only levels of anger were significantly different between the justice
violation condition and the control condition.
Primary Analyses
Next, I tested the experimental condition’s effect on the key variables in Experiment 3.
As described above, the variable that differentiates Experiment 3 is participant’s score on the
antisaccade task. Each person’s level of cognitive control is represented by the number of errors
made on block 2 of the task. Higher numbers of errors indicated a lack of cognitive control.
Overall, participants averaged 6.60 errors on the 48 trials presented in this block, with a range of
0 to 22. Analysis showed that participants’ error scores were not associated with any pre
measures. Analysis of variance showed that errors on block 2 were not significantly different
between the two conditions (Ms = 6.72 vs. 6.47), F(1,118) = 0.07, p > .25. Scores on war
attitudes also were not affected by the condition participants were in (Ms = 3.91 vs. 3.72),
F(1,118) = 0.35, p > .25. As with the previous three studies, the main independent variable
(condition) did not affect the criterion variable (war attitudes).
Next, I investigated the relationship between anger and war attitudes. This relationship
was in the predicted positive direction, but was not statistically significant, Beta = .18, p > .10. In
Experiment 3, only trait aggression moderated the anger-war attitudes relationship. This is quite
different from the results of Experiment 1 in which anger-war attitudes was moderated by four
variables. Further exploration of the nature of the interaction revealed that participants scoring
low on trait aggression actually had a stronger relationship between anger and pro-war attitudes,
B = .30, p < .06, than people who scored higher on trait aggression, B = -.003, p > .25. It is
unclear why participants who scored low on trait aggression might have showed a stronger anger
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– war relationship. Hence, pending replication of this surprising effect it seemed best to avoid
speculating on its meaning.
As with the preceding experiments, I tested the impact of the proposed intervening
variable. For Experiment 3, this variable was cognitive control and was measured by the
antisaccade task, as both a moderator and a mediator of the anger – war attitudes relationship.
Contrary to predictions, analyses showed that errors on block 2 of the antisaccade task did not
moderate the association between anger and war attitudes, Beta = -.34, p > .10. Cognitive control
was tested as an intervening variable through regression analysis similar to those conducted in
the previous experiments and is presented in Figure 11. In the first path of these analyses, anger
was regressed onto condition, which resulted in a strong positive relationship, Beta = .45, p <
.001. Next, analysis revealed no relationship between anger and cognitive control, Beta = .09, p
> .25. The next step in the path analysis showed no relationship between errors and attitudes
towards war with North Korea, Beta = -.03, p > .25. Thus the hypothesis that the relationship
between anger and war attitudes was partially due to changes in cognitive control was not
supported by the present study. Higher levels of anger were marginally associated with war risk
estimates, Beta = .21, p = .08, however block 2 errors and war risk estimates were not at all
related, Beta = .05, p > .25. Analysis with serial multiple mediation using Hayes’ PROCESS
macro confirmed these null results, CI.95 = (-.109, .028).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 3 I found that levels of cognitive control were unrelated to the
experimental condition, discrete emotional experiences, and attitudes towards war. Thus, the
present results failed to support the hypothesis that experiences of anger affect cognitive control
abilities, which would in turn lead to higher levels of support for war. However, I do not believe

63

this notion should be necessarily rejected as an explanation for why anger affects war attitudes.
This particular study was the most “exploratory” of all three experiments and there were a
number of limitations that may have precluded results from aligning with the stated hypothesis.
One issue to consider is that the antisaccade task may not have been the best way to
measure the inhibition processes that I predicted would mediate the anger – war relationship. As
a reminder, I proposed that anger would lead to two important changes: angry individuals would
be unable to inhibit their motivation to process information less carefully, and would also be
unable to inhibit the aggressive impulses that considering war creates. The link I proposed
between the task and these processes is that they both would be related to the concept of
inhibiting a dominant response. For the antisaccade task, participants attempted to resist the
dominant orienting response of attending to the cue (the red circle). I also proposed that pro-war
participants do not inhibit their anger-derived automatic motivation to respond aggressively or to
inhibit the motivation to process information heuristically. However, inhibiting one’s gaze at a
circle on the screen and inhibiting an automatic positivity towards war may very well be quite
different processes. Inhibition is a concept with a great deal of complexities, and these particular
types of inhibition may have very different cognitive and motivational processes that drive them.
Thus, the processes measured by the antisaccade task may not have been a good representation
of the hypothesized inhibition processes that lead to pro-war attitudes.
Another potential impediment was the amount of time between the anger manipulation
and the completion of the war attitudes task. Based on personal experience with the materials and
pilot testing, the Experiment 3 cognitive control task took much longer to complete than
Experiment 1’s CFC scale and Experiment 2’s risk estimate scale and three risk preferences
items. This additional time between the manipulation and dependent variable may have caused
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the induced anger to dissipate and limit its effect on both the cognitive control task and the war
attitudes task.
Despite the results of Experiment 3, I believe it is important for future research to explore
the relationship between anger, cognitive control, and war support. Specifically studies should
look at alternative ways of measuring information processing other than the antisaccade task. I
will consider this and other potential limitations of the present research at the end of the General
Discussion.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Research on anger has demonstrated that anger is a potent emotion. Intense experiences
of anger can lead to negative outcomes in all facets of life including harming social relationships,
problematic work performance, and lower levels of physical and mental health. In order to better
understand and manage these outcomes, researchers have investigated the psychological factors
that are affected by anger and that lead to these negative consequences. These factors include
anger’s effects on broad psychological constructs such as judgment and decision-making,
cognitive processing, and attitude formation. For my dissertation I combined a number of these
sets of consequences to better understand anger and its outcomes. Specifically, my goal was to
explain and understand the boundary conditions of anger’s effect on one particular attitude
object, war support, by investigating processes such as judgment, perceptions, and cognitions.
The present study found some support that one construct, Consideration of Future Consequences,
plays an important role in the anger – war effect, but cast doubt on the two other hypothesized
mediators: risk and cognitive control. The results also raise a number of other important issues I
will discuss in the following sections.
Anger and War Attitudes
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One of the more interesting and surprising results of the present set of experiments is the
unstable nature of the anger and war attitudes association. Anger, whether in the form of trait
anger, experimentally induced state anger, or naturally occurring anger, has consistently been
related to war support, and in some cases causally increased support for war (Lambert, 2010;
Huddy, 2003; Sadler, 2005; Skitka, 2006). My studies show a small effect in Experiment 1 for
the full sample, but a large effect for males. Experiment 2 and 3 both show a relationship in the
expected direction, but the effect is not statistically significant and does not depend on gender.
This is somewhat puzzling given the available evidence in published studies.
Although I believe the evidence asserting an anger – war attitudes relationship is larger
than the evidence against it, the current studies put into question the size and consistency of the
effect. It is possible the anger – war link is a very small effect and therefore studies will not
always produce this outcome due to random variation. It could also be that anger only affects
war attitudes in specific situations and does not generalize to all conceptualizations of anger or
wars. There is also the possibility that the classic “file drawer” problem affects perceptions of the
relationship. That is, it’s possible that only the studies that found a relationship were published
and thus all knowledge of the effect is based on those particular studies. A meta-analysis of past
studies (published and unpublished) would be helpful to understand the consistency and general
size of the effect.
In terms of the present study, there are a few methodological factors that may have
contributed to underwhelming size of the anger-war attitudes relationship. One is the
experimental manipulation of anger. For this manipulation participants were instructed to write
about a time in their life they felt they were treated extremely unfairly. When people perceive
their sense of justice or fairness is violated, the dominant emotional response is anger. Results of
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the present studies confirm this fact. In all three experiments anger was higher for the treatment
condition than the control condition. Thus, the justice violation was effective in affecting
participants’ self-reported anger. However, the manipulation was not significantly related to
other important variables such as war attitudes or the three proposed mediators.
It is possible there is something about this particular emotional trigger that causes its
emotional impact to be lacking in strength or duration. The manipulation did not produce
objectively strong increases in anger. In all three studies, the experimental group’s average anger
ratings were less than 4, which is under the midpoint of the scale of 4.5. Thus, the current studies
cannot comment on what affect anger would have if the manipulation produced much higher
ratings of anger. It is possible, and quite logical, that much higher ratings of anger (for example,
anger at the midpoint and above) could produce effects where null results were found in the
present studies, and could produce a stronger anger-war correlation. Recent research in my lab
has also demonstrated that this justice violation manipulation increased anger ratings, but did not
directly affect the other dependent variables in the experiment (Lambert, Peak, Eadeh, Scherer,
& Schott, 2012, Experiment 4). Other more direct triggers of anger such as feelings of
frustration, threats to reputation, disrespect, goal blockage, or simply asking participants to write
about a time they felt anger specifically, could produce stronger experiences of anger. These
longer-lasting and intense experiences in the lab may result in a clearer impact on psychological
constructs. These triggers may also have higher external validity by more closely mimicking the
experience of anger and its consequences in everyday life. Future research should investigate
how the use of different emotion manipulations impacts the relationship between anger and war
attitudes.
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Another unique aspect of this dissertation is the operationalization of war attitudes. Past
studies on anger and war have assessed attitudes towards the Iraq War, the Afghan War, and the
“War on Terror” as their measure of war support. This is not at all surprising considering these
studies were all conducted in the 2000s while these military events were ongoing and an everpresent topic in the news media. However at the time the present study was conducted (Fall
2011), the Iraq War was at a close and the Afghan War was no longer a widely discussed news
topic. My concern with asking participants views of the war is that people would not have
meaningful opinions because they simply would not know what the current situation was.
Because there were no other current wars with direct American involvement, I elected to
create a hypothetical, yet realistic scenario for an American military conflict. However, it is
possible that the North Korea/United States conflict presented in the war passage lead to a few
issues that prevented a stronger anger – war attitudes effect. The most obvious difference
between the North Korea war scenario and the war attitude measures of past studies is that the
present scenario forced participants to contemplate and imagine the presented military situation
was currently happening and develop an opinion of how the United States would handle it
moving forward. The additional cognitive effort required by the task (reading and understanding
the passage, writing out their thoughts) may have weakened their level of anger and its impact on
“hawkish” attitudes.
Another difference between these two types of war measures is that items concerning the
Iraq/Afghan Wars are nearly always pertaining to the continuation of war. In contrast, the North
Korea scenario was about beginning a military conflict. This is an important distinction because
it may be that the consequences of anger are more pronounced when continuing a current
behavior or attitude versus embarking on a brand new set of thoughts and actions.8 Future studies
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should attempt to vary the “real vs. hypothetical” war factor and whether the conflict in question
is a continuation of, or a start to, military engagement.
The role of Immediacy in Consideration of Future Consequences and War
In order to fully understand the implications of the results of Experiment 1, it is important
to take a step back and discuss the key differences between people who score high versus low on
the CFC scale. Those scoring low on CFC are most concerned with immediacy. They will gladly
trade negative experiences later for good fortune today. Importantly, they will attempt to
maximize immediate benefits, even at the expense of future costs. These immediate benefits can
come in two main forms: experiencing hedonically pleasing events or avoiding negative
experiences. For someone who scores low in CFC, this tendency to maximize immediate benefits
could affect behavior in two distinct contexts. One is a situation in which the individual chooses
behavior with a hedonically pleasurable outcome in the present but yields negative consequences
in the future. An example of this would be choosing to smoke cigarettes. Smoking cigarettes is
often evaluated as a positive immediate experience, yet can have extremely negative effects in
the long term. A separate situation is one in which an individual who is low on CFC would
choose to avoid a negative experience in the present that eventually causes a lack of a positive
outcome in the future. An example of such a scenario would be someone choosing not to do the
hard work involved with studying for a difficult college exam, which results in poor academic
performance and limited opportunities in the future. In this example, the individual is not
necessarily behaving in a way that will reap extremely positive benefits in the short term, but
instead is acting to avoid negative feelings. In both situations people are maximizing the benefits
of the present in detriment to their future, but they differ in whether that immediate benefit is
pleasurable or merely just avoiding a negative, unpleasant experience in the short term. This
difference is important to fully understand the effects of CFC on behavior and the fact that it can
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vary depending on the given situation, including the topic of this present work – CFC and war
support.
My results indicate that CFC ratings are related to attitudes towards war. Because people
who score low on CFC maximize immediate benefits in the manner discussed above, this leads
to the question of which form of maximization took place. One could make an argument for
either. It is possible that supporting an American military attack on North Korea would provide
a moment of immediate pleasure. Evidence suggests that taking aggressive actions, such as
engaging in war, can produce positive feelings. One reason for this positivity can be revenge.
Revenge is associated with positivity and specifically expectations of positive feelings (see
Lambert, Eadeh, Peak, & Schott, 2012 for a full discussion). In the war passage of this study,
bombing North Korea could be seen as an act of revenge, and thus present an opportunity to
maximize immediate hedonic pleasure. However, it is also possible that low CFC individuals
supported this war because doing so would protect them from aversive, negative feelings. This
could be the case if individuals believed that in the U.S.-North Korea war scenario, North Korea
would soon be attacking the United States and its allies. To prevent this clearly negative
immediate outcome, individuals with a temporal orientation focused on the near-term, may then
be willing to take action and go to war to prevent this outcome in the present, regardless of what
the distant future outcome may be. It is also conceivable that both acquiring positive and
avoiding negative experiences in the present are motivations occurring simultaneously for those
people scoring low in CFC in this study.
This helps us to explain why low CFCers were supportive of American military
involvement with North Korea. There are also a few notable reasons why high CFCers were
against the war. The fact that there is a negative relationship between CFC and war support
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indicates that when people were thinking more about the long term ramifications of the war they
tended to support the war less. This result strongly implies that there were indeed a number of
negative long-term consequences that influenced their negative attitudes towards military
conflict by the United States. In the writing section, participants cited concerns over greater
instability in the region, and fears of both monetary costs and loss of life. They also cited that a
long war could deplete the military and a war in that region may increase the likelihood of a
conflict with China because the Chinese are unlikely to tolerate a protracted war off their Eastern
Coast. All of these reasons are likely to apply to almost any war and therefore implies that CFC
and war attitudes may be negatively related in general, and not just specifically to this particular
war scenario.
Awareness/Concern models of CFC
In the previous section I discussed how maximizing benefits in the immediate setting can
take on multiple forms for low CFCers. It is important then to follow up on this by noting that
the broader literature on CFC has discussed the various ways in which future consequences are
processed by participants who score low in CFC. Joireman, Strathman, and Balliet (2006) have
proposed two models to explain how low CFCers approach future outcomes: the Awareness
Model and the Concern Model. The Awareness Model presumes that people who score high or
low in CFC differ in that the latter are not even aware of the future consequences of their current
behavior. These people are not considering future consequences because they do not even know
of them. Thus, these consequences do not impact their current decision-making because they are
not aware of their existence. For example, an individual may choose not to eat vegetables at all
during their life because they are unaware of the positive, long-term benefits of doing so. In
contrast, the Concern Model proposes that both high and low scorers on CFC are indeed aware
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of the potential positive or negative future outcomes of their current behavior. The difference lies
in their sensitivity to future consequences. High CFCers are very concerned about whether these
long term outcomes are pleasant or unpleasant whereas those on the opposite end of the spectrum
place a low priority on ramifications that are far off and seemingly distant. Thus, it is focus, not
awareness that is the explanatory mechanism in the Concern Model.
I am not proposing one over the other in the current study. However, these models do
present differing accounts of why low CFCers may have been more supportive of war, and it is
helpful to present these accounts to gain a clearer understanding of my results. An explanation
consistent with the Awareness model would be that participants scoring low in CFC were not
cognizant of potential long term negative (or positive) consequences of war. Something about
their current state (possibly experiencing anger) prevented these participants from generating
cognitions related to long term outcomes of the presented scenario. In contrast, the Concern
Model would explain my results as low CFCers considering potential outcomes of the war but
not putting much weight on these distinct consequences, and instead basing their choices on the
current (presumably positive) consequences of war. Thus, they may have been fully aware of the
possible outcome of a huge financial and military cost, but did not put much weight into this
possibility. Although both models agree on the end result, they differ in their view of the roads
taken by low CFCers to arrive at their attitudes and judgments.
Implications of Temporal Orientation as a Moderator Variable
As noted above, the fact that individuals who are focused on rewards in the short term
over the long term showed a stronger anger – war relationship, indicates that people perceive
that they will experience a type of positive benefit in the present if they go to war. Put simply,
people who are angry and focusing on the short term will likely be more supportive of war. This
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has important practical implications for the political leaders’ and the general public’s views of
war.
For example, if a political entity would like to alter the opinions of a group of politicians
or the mass public towards an anti-war position, it may help to have them consider the longer
term consequences of military conflict. It is possible that individuals focus their attention on the
present factors and consequences of military actions by default. That is, they automatically
consider the present consequences to a greater degree than future considerations. Research
suggests this is indeed the case when people are angry (Gray, 1999). A simple reminder to “think
long-term” may cause individuals to stop and consider outcomes down the road and then
decrease their support for the war.
Instead of focusing on how the war may be beneficial in the present (reduce a threat,
revenge) having them imagine the long-term consequences or simply listing the potential future
negative effects of war (monetary costs, loss of civilian and military lives, possible escalation of
the war) may shift attitudes in the anti-war direction. In contrast, pro-war entities should do the
reverse and highlight the perceived short-term benefits of engaging in war to increase
favorability for their side.
It is important to note that this strategy of focusing on the future may increase pro-war
sentiment in some circumstances. If the situation is such that a threat to a home country is most
likely far in the future (i.e., an adversary does not have military power to attack now, but will in
ten years), this increased attention to the future may cause the public to become more favorable
to war in the present.

Consideration of Future Consequences and Political Attitudes
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Another question raised by the present studies is whether considering future
consequences and political attitudes are related constructs. Both sides of the political spectrum
could easily make the case that their ideology is focused on long-term consequences while the
opposing political view is overly short-sighted. For example, political liberals would argue that
conservatives do not think about the long-term effects of pollution and climate change or the
hedonically pleasurable, but morally problematic use of torture on terrorists. On the other hand
conservatives might say liberals do not think about the long-term financial consequences of the
growth of federal entitlement programs or the future consequences of “soft” punishments for
terrorists and other criminals.
Experiment 1’s finding that considering immediate consequences over future
consequences is associated with the politically conservative position of supporting war, does
provide some evidence (albeit, only on one policy issue) of a negative relationship between CFC
and conservatism. Some past research has also indicated that CFC is associated with politically
conservative policy initiatives. However there is reason to be cautious about making this
conclusion. First, political orientation and CFC are only marginally related in the present study (r
= -.17, p = .08). However it is important to note that both RWA (r = -.06, p = .50) and SDO (r =
-.18, p = .06) correlate in the same negative direction as political orientation, with SDO also
showing a marginally significant relationship. Thus, the current results do not indicate a strong
association between CFC and political attitudes. Second, past research has suggested that high
CFC scores correlate with support for pro-environmental causes such as off-shore drilling
(Strathman, 1994), public transportation (Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004) and higher
rates of recycling (Ebreo & Vining, 2001; Lindsay & Strathman, 1997). However, a closer look
at the Strathman (1994) paper reveals that CFC is not always related to conservative policies in
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their studies. Although this paper is cited as showing that CFC is related to decreased support for
oil drilling, it also shows that this effect is dependent on its framing. When advantages of oil
drilling are framed as occurring in the future, it is actually high CFC individuals supporting oil
drilling. Thus, at least in the case of domestic oil drilling, it is the temporal framing of the
advantages and disadvantages that is determining responses and not merely the possibility of
overlapping properties between CFC and conservatism. The combination of the current results
and past studies does indicate that High CFC scores may lean closer towards liberalism than
conservatism.
The ways in which CFC may affect political attitudes (or vice versa) is an important area
for future research. Clearly, neither political orientation’s policy preferences are always geared
toward maximizing the long-term consequences of their actions. However, it is possible that state
or trait CFC levels may be generally associated with one type of political orientation or the other.
Just as conscientiousness and openness are two personality factors related to political attitudes,
CFC may also be one such factor. Future research should investigate this issue at the trait level,
as well as how situational forces can affect state CFC and political attitudes simultaneously.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There is a great deal we do not understand about anger and how it affects people’s
support for military action. The results of the present studies show that there are key areas future
research should explore concerning the anger – war attitudes effect, including its mechanisms
and boundary conditions.
Research on Anger and War Attitudes
Researchers should continue to explore the strength of the anger – war effect and explore
the conditions in which anger does and does not affect beliefs about war. My results indicate that
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the effect may not be as robust and consist as previously believed. Researchers should utilize
differing measurements of state and trait anger, as well as anger manipulations to see how using
various operationalizations of anger affects the anger-war attitudes relationship. As discussed
previously, war attitudes should be measured using a number of different methods. These
include using Likert scales to assess attitudes about current wars, views of war in the abstract,
and hypothetical wars, to understand how effects differ between these variations. In regards to
the latter method, the present results indicate that measurement using hypothetical war passages
may reduce the effect and are likely less generalizable. However, based on just these studies,
there is no way to know if these effects were idiosyncratic to the specific war scenario devised
for this project, or if they apply to all manufactured war situations.
Also, I am not aware of any studies that test if anger’s effect only pertains to wars that
involve participants’ “home” countries. Studies conducted in the United States have measured
war attitudes with the war in question directly involving the U.S. (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan). It is
not clear if anger increases support for military engagement for countries of which one is neither
a citizen nor a resident. For example, if American participants have a positive anger and war
correlation when the countries in conflict are two African nations, this implies that the effect of
anger generalizes out to support for war in a very broad way. Importantly, this would imply that
anger’s influence on war attitudes is not exclusively based on perceptions of threat to one’s self
or country. Because America is highly unlikely to be affected by a war in two African countries
(the U.S. homeland is especially unlikely to be harmed in this scenario), concerns over threat to
one’s home country is not likely to be a factor in causing anger’s increase in support for war. In
the present studies, we gathered information on participants’ citizenship. Non-American citizens
did not show different patterns of war attitudes than U.S. citizens. However, these non-citizens
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were students currently residing in America, so they were clearly not detached from any threat
towards America, and thus this is not an alternative to this proposed research design.
Another area that has not been investigated is anger’s possible affect on implicit war
attitudes. Anger may be affecting positivity towards war at a more unconscious level and the
explicit, self-report measures used in all past research is not able to capture these changes in
implicit beliefs. Participants may be unaware of how their war attitudes have changed. Or they
may be unwilling to report their increased war support, due to factors such as social desirability
and a preference to appear anti-war (especially because college campuses are generally quite
“dovish” regarding war). An implicit war attitude measure may be a way to diminish this
potential problem.
Alternative Measurement of Potential Mediators
Temporal Orientation
Future studies should also continue to investigate potential mechanisms that explain why
anger causes an increase in favorability towards military conflict. The present results suggest that
considering the present consequences of the war instead of the future consequences is one way
anger affects war attitudes. I believe researchers should continue to examine CFC in the context
of emotion and aggressive acts such as war attitudes to better understand its role as a potential
mediator or moderator of this effect. Using CFC as a trait (rather than state) variable may
provide additional insight into the role of temporal orientation and war.
Another approach would be to directly manipulate the extent to which people are
thinking about the present and future consequences of their actions. The study could consist of a
“present orientation” condition, a “future orientation” condition, and a control condition. The
two experimental conditions would differ in that the present group would be instructed to read
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the passage while keeping in mind the short term advantages and disadvantages of the war
scenario while the future condition would be asked to think long term. Both groups would then
write out their reasons for their respective time periods. My prediction is that the present
orientation condition would show higher levels of support than the control or future condition.
It is important to remember that CFC is only one particular way of measuring temporal
orientation. There are a number of constructs that measure thinking about the present versus the
future that would be extremely important to measure as potential moderators or mediators for the
anger – war relationship. One of these constructs is delay discounting. Delay discounting is
people’s tendency to choose a smaller, but immediate reward instead of a delayed, larger reward
(Green & Myerson, 2010). This can be viewed as a maladaptive strategy because in the long run,
it results in smaller gains. Although most individuals tend to show some degree of discounting,
people who are more present-orientated show higher rates of discounting because they tend to
overvalue rewards in the present even more than the average person.
Delay discounting can be measured in various ways, but a common method is to present a
series of choices in which there is a reward that can be attained in the present versus a larger
reward in the future (i.e. $650 now OR $1,000 in ten years). Participants are given a number of
combinations of choices varying in size of the rewards and the amount of time for the delayed
reward. A delay discounting score for each person is calculated based on factors such as when
the individual begins to switch over to picking the immediate reward instead of the delayed
reward (and vice versa depending on what was first given to the participant). This measure,
along with other related constructs such as delay of gratification (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999) and
time perspective (Zimbardo, 1999), would serve as quality alternative methods of assessing
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temporal orientation in an anger and war attitudes study, providing us with a clearer
understanding of the role of temporal orientation in the anger – war relationship.
One area of psychological research that has provided unique insight on temporal
orientation, anger, and aggression is clinical psychology. Although CFC has not, to my
knowledge, been studied in the clinical literature, another related time orientation-based
construct that has an important role for psychopathology is impulsivity.
Research indicates that anger and impulsivity may interact in a way that amplifies their
effects within specific clinical disorders and pathological behaviors. For example, research
shows that anger and impulsivity both affect the likelihood of physical abuse for patients with
Borderline Personality Disorders (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993). Furthermore, anger and
impulsivity are important for diagnosing and understanding Psychopathy (Jackson, Neumann, &
Vitacco, 2007) and impulsivity has been found to moderate the relationship between anger and
eating disordered behavior in bulimic patients (Engel, Boseck, Crosby, Wonderlich, Mitchell,
Smyth, Miltenberger, & Steiger, 2007). In addition to the clinical research on anger and
impulsivity, studies have indicated that impulsiveness can lead to more aggressive behaviors.
Impulsivity is a prominent personality variable associated with alcoholism (Sher & Trull, 1994;
Whiteside & Lynam, 2009) and leads to various negative consequences including physical
altercations and other forms of violence (Park, 2004). Also, impulsivity is associated with more
aggressive behaviors such as spousal abuse, especially in men with Antisocial Personality
Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder (Edwards, Scott, Yarvis, Paizis, & Panizzon,
2003). This relationship between anger, impulsivity, and aggressive behaviors in the clinical
literature suggest that anger and time orientation can be studied outside of the domain of CFC.
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Therefore, it is important for future research to investigate if impulsivity plays a role in
understanding how anger causes changes in an aggressive attitude construct such as war support.
CFC is associated with a number of pro-social outcomes such as recycling, (Strathman et
al., 1994) lower rates of substance abuse (Strathman et al., 1994) higher GPAs (Joireman, 1999)
and engaging in higher rates of physical activity (Ouellette, 2005). There is a strong case to make
that if more individuals were orientated towards long-term consequences rather than short-term
consequences, it could have a number of important positive effects on society. Unfortunately,
there is no direct evidence of interventions increasing individuals’ motivation or ability to
consider future consequences. However, there is some indirect evidence that treatments can
affect time orientation and subsequent behavior. This evidence from the clinical literature shows
that a number of treatments have been designed to decrease impulsivity and make fewer
decisions that are focused on the short-term that result in negative consequences. This research
shows that treatments such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Self-Statement Modification and
Modeling treatments have been at least mildly effective in treating impulsivity in disorders such
as Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Conduct Disorder based on a meta-analysis of
impulsivity and treatments in children by Bear & Nietzel (1991). Based on these findings,
researchers should continue to investigate the methods in which people can alter their behavior to
consider future consequences more thoroughly and thus make decisions that benefit the
individual as well as society as a whole.
Risk
In my results, the concepts of risk perception and risk preference did not prove to be
related to either anger or war. As noted previously, the lack of an anger – risk relationship was
especially surprising considering results of past research, that used very similar methods to those
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used in the present study. With this in mind, future research should employ different measures of
risk perception and risk preference to further investigate if they are indeed important constructs
in the anger – war relationship. One potential obstacle is that there appears to be very few
general measures of risk perception (Olofsson & Rashid, 2011). The majority of scales for both
risk perception and risk preference are created to address risk in specific domains such as driving
(White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004), sexual behaviors (Adefuye, Abiona, Balogun, & Lukobo-Durrell,
2009), environmental issues (Peters & Slovic, 1996), and health concerns (Watson, Lloyd,
Meyer, Eeles, Ebbs, & Murday, 1999), and not to assess an individual’s “overall” level of risk
perception.
Of course, a single risk perception measure of driving behaviors is unlikely to be a valid
measure of one’s general risk perception and thus cannot be used to measure risk perception in a
differing paradigm such as anger and war. However, one way to get a general sense of risk
perception is to use a number of items from all these different domains. For example, picking
one item from a risk perception measure of HIV, another from climate change concern, and so
forth could allow for a more broad measure of someone’s current risk perception. With this type
of measure, one could then investigate how risk perception is related to anger and war attitudes.
Another approach to measuring risk perception is to create a measure in which
participants are given specific scenarios and asked how likely the negative outcome is to occur.
For example, participants can be provided a scenario in which a driver is stopped at a red light
and takes a right turn without looking for oncoming cars on a busy road. Then ask the
participant, “how likely is it that the driver will get into an auto accident if this act is performed”.
Participants can respond using an 11-point scale, with each scale point representing a percentage
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from the range of 0% to 100%. Using a number of these items in different risky domains, one
can obtain a measure of an individual’s risk perception.
The process of selecting alternative measures of risk preference has similar obstacles to
measuring risk perception. That is, most risk preference measures are specific to a particular risk
domain. Luckily the same solution can be applied to risk preference. Using different risk
preference tasks over various areas should provide a general sense of one’s level of risk-taking.
It is unclear exactly why the measures used in the present study did not replicate previous
research. However, because these data did not match the predicted hypotheses, further research
in this area should attempt alternate means of measuring these important constructs.
Cognitive Control
The present results did not suggest that there is a cognitive control element to the anger
and war relationship. Cognitive control is a broad concept and the antisaccade task I used is
clearly not the only way of capturing everything that is associated with cognitive control. One
simpler way to measure if cognitive abilities in general affect attitudes towards war would be to
randomly assign participants to either a cognitive load manipulation or a control group and then
measure war attitudes. If participants in the cognitive load condition express more support for
war than the control group, it would suggest that a reduction in cognitive abilities does increase
support for war. Because heuristic processing can be due to a lack of cognitive resources, this
would suggest that war support and processing information in a less detailed way are related
concepts.
Aside from cognitive measures, one avenue would be to assess information processing
style (heuristic versus systematic) directly by using a measure that gives each participant a
processing style score. However, studies that measure processing style routinely use measures
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that determine whether heuristic or systematic processing merely exists. Importantly, these
studies do not award a particular processing style value for each participant. Without a score of
information processing, one cannot use the processing variable to determine if it moderates or
mediates the anger – war relationship. For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) showed that
anger is related to heuristic processing through an expertise/persuasion paradigm. In their study,
participants that completed an anger manipulation were more persuaded by an essay written by
“experts” than by presumed non-experts on the subject. Control group participants did not favor
one essay over the other. Both essays were identical except for the essay’s formatting and the
occupation of the author. Thus, it appeared that participants in the anger condition were relying
more heavily on the cue of presumed expertise to make their judgments of the essay than
participants in the control group. This reliance on expertise was because participants were using
a more heuristic processing style when consuming the content within the essay. This is a fine
study for understanding if anger affects processing style, but this type of study does not assign a
value for each person’s level of processing. Without a value for processing style, it is not
possible to test for moderation or mediation. Because most, if not all, processing style studies use
similar methods, there is currently no clear method for determining the degree to which
processing style moderates or mediates anger and war studies.
A measure that is somewhat close to being a direct measure is the well-known Need for
Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). However, this scale, which investigates the degree to
which people prefer engaging in effortful cognitive activities, is used at the trait-level and is not
devised to measure changes in processing style due to manipulated incidental emotion. Need for
Cognition would be an interesting construct to test for its possible relationship with state or trait
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anger and whether it is related to support for military conflict, but it would not be a good
candidate to understand changes in processing style due to an anger manipulation.
A FINAL WORD
Steven Pinker (2012) and other prominent scholars have argued that violence and war
across the globe are currently at their lowest levels in human history. Although this belief very
well may be accurate, it is quite unlikely that war will ever be completely eradicated from the
human experience. Because violence and aggression are ever-present aspects of humanity, it is
vital that the scientific community continues to probe attitudes towards war to understand their
genesis and why they persist despite the negative outcomes that they generate. I believe
emotions, including anger, are extremely important factors in the development of both pro and
anti-war attitudes. This is important to understand not just in the context of public opinion, but
also for the political and military leaders that ultimately make the life and death decisions
involving international and intranational conflict. With continued research and exploration of
these important ideas, we may one day understand the mechanisms that shape our beliefs and
behaviors concerning war and all forms of violence with the aim of reducing their devastating
impact.
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Footnotes
1

It may seem odd that positive life events could be considered a measure of “risk”.

However, both serve as general measures of optimism, which is believed to be a very similar
construct to risk perception. Lerner & Keltner (2001) also used both positive and negative event
estimates to measure risk perception, and that was the approach taken here. Responses to
negative and positive events were correlated (r = .25, p = .003). When separating risk perception
into negative and positive events, both constructs showed somewhat similar relationships
between the key variables of interest. Combining both to form the measure of risk perception
produces very good reliability alpha = .74.
2

For Experiment1, war attitudes were measured before war risk for all participants. In

Experiment 2, the order of presentation for war attitudes and war risk was counterbalanced.
Results showed presentation order had no effect on scores. Experiment 2 was conducted
chronologically before Experiment 1. Because there were no order effects, the war attitudes
measure was presented before the war risk measure for Experiments 1 and 3.
3

An important assumption in an analysis of covariance is the homogeneity of regression

slopes assumption. Initial analyses of anger, controlling for anxiety, were consistent with this
assumption. However, analyses of covariance using sadness were not. Thus, for the ANCOVA
with condition as the independent variable and anger as the dependent variable, only anxiety is
included as a covariate in the results to be reported ahead.
4

Based on the recommendation from Aiken and West (1991) all regression coefficients

reported will be unstandardized Bs instead of the standardized Betas reported for all other
regression analyses.
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5

In the classic Asian Disease Problem scenario, the outbreak is described as an “unusual

Asian disease”. Because the hypothetical war scenario in the present study involved Asian
countries (North and South Korea) the word “Asian” was replaced with the word “toxic” to
avoid any possible issue that this overlap may create.
6

Payne (2005) presented the target object for 100 ms. However, in piloting this task, very

few errors were recorded for either block 1 or block 2 at this presentation speed. A presentation
of 60ms did result in more errors, and thus this speed was used in the present experiment.
7

Tests of the homogeneity of regression slopes assumption reveled that the sadness X

condition interaction was significant, F(1,117) = 10.00, p = .002. Thus only anxiety and not
sadness was included as a covariate in the ANCOVA with condition as the independent variable
and anger as the dependent variable.
8

In contrast, a key advantage of using a hypothetical war scenario is that participants

cannot have pre-existing attitudes towards the studied conflict. These pre-existing attitudes are
likely to harden their opinions, and thus be less malleable to the impact of an angering
experience.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics – Mean levels for each construct. Standard Deviation in parentheses.
CFC = Consideration of Future Consequences.

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

1. Trait Anger

4.26 (1.07)

4.38 (1.17)

4.11 (1.16)

2. Trait Aggression

3.25 (1.14)

3.12 (0.94)

3.42 (1.07)

3. Sensation Seeking

5.70 (1.60)

5.66 (1.51)

6.16 (1.45)

4. Political Orientation

3.68 (1.03)

3.66 (1.23)

3.65 (1.27)

5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism

2.69 (1.05)

2.71 (1.00)

2.73 (0.99)

6. Social Dominance Orientation

3.16 (1.15)

3.00 (1.23)

3.12 (1.25)

7. Pre Manipulation Anger

2.04 (1.25)

1.81 (1.10)

2.07 (1.24)

8. Post Manipulation Anger

2.50 (1.67)

2.19 (1.51)

2.68 (1.90)

9. War Attitudes

3.58 (1.66)

3.92 (1.65)

3.81 (1.73)

10. War Risk

3.77 (1.10)

4.15 (1.09)

3.77 (0.93)

11. CFC

6.07 (1.23)

N/A

N/A

12. Risk Perception

N/A

4.07 (0.83)

N/A

13. Cognitive Control Errors

N/A

N/A

6.60 (4.87)
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Table 2
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Individual Difference Variables – Experiment 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Trait Anger

(.83)

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

2. Trait Aggression

.54*** (.84)

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

3. Sensation Seeking

-.13

.20*

(.82)

--

--

--

--

--

--

4. Political Orientation

.06

.06

.05

(.72)

--

--

--

--

--

5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism

.21*

.17†

.00

.58*** (.88)

--

--

--

--

6. Social Dominance Orientation

.25** .30** .00

.40*** .22*

(.91)

--

--

--

7. Pre Manipulation Anger

.39*** .29** .01

.15

.20*

.15

(.85)

--

--

8. Pre Manipulation Anxiety

.36*** .08

-.04

-.02

.09

.13

.56*** (.80)

9. Pre Manipulation Sadness

.40*** .09

-.16

.01

.14

.07

.62*** .65*** (.82)

Note. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

***

p < .001.
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Table 3
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Post Manipulation Mood Indices - Experiment 1

1

2

3

1. Anger Index

(.93)

--

--

2. Anxiety Index

.36***

(.86)

--

3. Sadness Index

.69***

.59***

(.81)

Note. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

***

p < .001.
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Table 4
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Moderators of Anger – War relationship – Experiment 1

1

2

3

4

1. Gender

--

--

--

--

2. CFC

.14

(.86)

--

--

3. Trait aggression

-.31**

-.10

(.84)

--

4. Political Orientation

-.37***

-.17†

.06

(.72)

Note. Gender coded such that 1 = male and 2 = female.
†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

***

p < .001. CFC = Consideration of Future Consequences Scale.
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Figure captions
Figure 1
Overview of proposed mediators/moderators.
Figure 2
Schematic overview of design of Experiments 1 – 3.
Figure 3
Regression Analyses of Gender as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes Relationship in
Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.
Figure 4
Regression Analyses of Political Orientation as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes
Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.
Figure 5
Regression Analyses of Trait Aggression as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes
Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.
Figure 6
Regression Analyses of Consideration of Future Consequences as a moderator of the Anger and
War Attitudes Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and
premeasured anger.
Figure 7
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized beta
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. CFC was coded such that higher scores

103

indicate higher concern for immediate consequences rather than future consequences. †p < .10.
*

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Figure 8
Males only. Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized
beta coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in
parentheses reflect the simple relation of the variables question. CFC was coded such that higher
scores indicate higher concern for immediate consequences rather than future consequences. †p <
.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 9
Females only. Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized
beta coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in
parentheses reflect the simple relation of the variables in question. CFC was coded such that
higher scores indicate higher concern for future consequences rather than immediate
consequences. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 10
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 2. All values are standardized beta
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. Risk Perception was coded such that higher
scores indicate perceptions of higher levels of risk. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 11
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 3. All values are standardized beta
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. Errors were coded such that higher scores
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indicate higher levels of errors and thus less cognitive control abilities. †p < .10. *p < .05. **p <
.01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 3 (Experiment 1)
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Figure 4 (Experiment 1)
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Figure 5 (Experiment 1)
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Figure 6 (Experiment 1)

Consideration of Future Consequences
6

War Support

5

4

High CFC (consider future)
Mid Level CFC

3

Low CFC (consider present)

2

1
1 SD Below

1 SD Above

Anger
111

Figure 7 (Experiment 1: All participants)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 8 (Experiment 1: Males only)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 9 (Experiment 1: Females only)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 10 (Experiment 2)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 11 (Experiment 3)

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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APPENDIX A
Trait Anger
1. I have a fiery temper.
2. I am quick-tempered.
3. I am a hotheaded person.
4. I get annoyed when I am singled out for correction.
5. It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others.
6. I get angry when I am slowed down by others mistakes.
7. I feel infuriated when I do a good job and get a poor evaluation.
8. I fly off the handle.
9. I feel annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work.
10. People who think they are always right irritate me.
11. When I get mad, I say nasty things.
12. When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone.
13. It makes my blood boil when I am pressured.

Trait Aggression
Physical Aggression
1. Once in a while I can't control the urge to strike another person.
2. Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.
3. If somebody hits me, I hit back.
4. I get into fights a little more than the average person.
5. If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.
6. There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows.
7. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person.
8. I have threatened people I know.
9. I have become so mad that I have broken things.
Verbal Aggression
1. I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them.
2. I often find myself disagreeing with people.
3. When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them.
4. I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with me.
5. My friends say that I'm somewhat argumentative.

Sensation Seeking Scale
1. I would like to explore strange places.
2. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned routes or timetables.
3. I get restless when I spend too much time at home.
4. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.
5. I like to do frightening things.
6. I would like to try bungee jumping.
7. I like wild parties.
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8. I would love to have new and exciting experiences, even if they are illegal.

Political Orientation
1. I consider myself to be politically liberal.
2. I consider myself to be politically conservative.
Economic conservatism
3. It would be better for America to have a publicly funded health care system for all Americans
rather than a for-profit private health care system.
4. The U.S. Government already spends too much giving money to the poor.
5. All the regulations placed on American business by the government are harming the economy
by not allowing the free market to work as it should.
6. Rich Americans should have to pay more in taxes than they currently do.
Toughness conservatism
7. It would be good if we had more immigrants in the United States.
8. I support “English only” laws requiring all government business to be conducted in English.
9. The death penalty should be eliminated from the American judicial system.
Moral conservatism
10. There should be few limitations on abortion in this country.
11. Terminally ill people should have the right to physician-assisted suicide.
12. I support full legalization of homosexual marriage.

Social Dominance Orientation
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No group should dominate in society.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism
1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and
protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance.
2. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
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3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in the government and
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in
people's minds.
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit
as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
5. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways even if this
upsets many people.
6. Our country will be destroyed one day if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our
moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
7. Everyone should have their own life-style, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it
makes them different from everyone else.
8. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
9. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us
back to our true path.
10. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
11. There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
12. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
13. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
14. It's better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the
government have the power to censor them.
15. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not
necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.
16. The situation is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated
the troublemakers and got us back on our true path.
17. Once our government leaders give us the "go ahead," it will be the duty of every patriotic
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

Risk Perception - Likelihood of life events
Positive
1. Good job offer before graduation
2. Graduating in top third of class
3. Home doubles in value in 5 years
4. Your work recognized with award
5. Living past 80
6. Your achievements in newspaper
7. No night in hospital for 5 years
8. Having a mentally gifted child
9. Marrying someone wealthy
10. Statewide recognition in your profession
11. Weight constant for 10 years
Negative
1. Having a drinking problem
2. Attempting suicide
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3. Divorced a few years after married
4. Heart attack before age 40
5. Contracting venereal disease
6. Being fired from a job
7. Getting lung cancer

Consideration of Future Consequences
1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to
day behavior.
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for
many years.
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself.
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes of
my actions.
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take.
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future
outcomes.
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative
outcome will not occur for many years.
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences than a
behavior with less-important immediate consequences.
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will
be resolved before they reach crisis level.
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at
a later time.
11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems that
may occur at a later date.
12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior
that has distant outcomes.

U.S.-N. Korea scenario attitudes
1. Under these circumstances, the United States should immediately begin bombing North
Korea.
2. America would be completely justified in attacking N. Korea.
3. America should not go to war with North Korea, more diplomacy should be used to resolve
the situation.
4. It would be a huge mistake for the United States to attack N. Korea.
5. The United States should invade N. Korea.
6. The United States should begin to move soldiers into S. Korea in order to advance into N.
Korea.
7. Under the current circumstances, I do not support going to war with N. Korea.
8. The United States should use all force necessary to protect S. Korea from N. Korea.
9. The United States should not go to war with N. Korea because the U.S. cannot constantly get
involved with other countries’ affairs.
10. The tensions between S. Korea and N. Korea are none of the United States’ business.
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11. It would be irresponsible for the United States not to attack N. Korea if they begin to invade
S. Korea.
12. The United States will look weak if they do not engage militarily with N. Korea.

U.S. - N. Korea outcome likelihood estimates (risk perceptions):
1. If the United States were to attack North Korea, there would be a high probability that the U.S.
would meet its objectives.
2. It would be risky for the United States to engage in a military conflict with North Korea, given
the hypothetical situation presented in the passage.
3. The United States will be able to stop N. Korea from invading S. Korea through military force.
4. N. Korea poses a great risk to the United States.
5. I believe at least 5,000 United States soldiers will die if America invades N. Korea.
6. I believe at least 50,000 civilians will die if the United States invades N. Korea.
7. If the United States were to invade N. Korea the U.S. would have to keep soldiers in N. Korea
for as long as the U.S. has in Iraq, if not longer.
8. A war against N. Korea would not cost the United States nearly as much monetarily as in the
war in Iraq.
9. There is not much risk involved for the United States in attacking N. Korea.
10. There is a good probability that the benefits of going to war with N. Korea will outweigh the
benefits of going to war for the United States.
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